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"snapshots": one is the planning process and the other is the execution process. The 
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determine its organizational fitness. The results indicate that the proposed organization is 
fit if changes are made to make the planning process highly centralized and the execution 
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This thesis considers the fitness of a proposed organization for the Navy, designed 
to operate in a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) environment. The research question 
answered is: "Is the proposed organizational structure fit in a NCW environment?" The 
Organizational Consultant expert system is used to analyze the proposed organization. 
Several characteristics of a command and control structure and decision processes 
are important to understand when designing a military organization. These include the 
roles of an organization, information processing, span of control, the process of 
command and control (the OODA loop), unity of command, unity of effort, commander's 
intent, planning, and adaptation. 
NCW, whose goal is to terminate conflicts very quickly and not allow wars of 
attrition to develop, is the Navy's response to information age conflicts. NCW derives its 
power from the robust networking of a geographically dispersed, but knowledgeable 
force. NCW is enabled by four interrelated supporting elements: enhanced situational 
awareness, speed of command, self-synchronization, and offensive distributed firepower. 
The proposed NCW organization is no longer centered around commanders of 
platforms. It is focused on the functions and processes that the force will need to self-
synchronized in the NCW environment. Ship commanding officers will be responsible 
for "m8nning, training, and equipping" the ships. The Force Commander will promulgate 
the overall intent while the fighting of the battle will be done by functional commanders: 
a Chief Knowledge Officer, a Chief Resources Officer, a Chief Effects Officer, and a 
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Figure ES-l. Command Relationships and Functions. 
Ideally, all assets will be used as one integrated force. However, Mission 
Commanders (MC) may be activated when the complexity of a mission is high and 
requires a special focus, to prevent overload of the functional commanders (span of 
control is too large), or forces are required to leave the mutual protection afforded by 
forces close together. 
Within this organization there are two distinct, yet still interrelated, processes 
occurring at the same time: planning and execution. The planning process is primarily 
performed by the force commander and is highly centralized. The execution process is 
performed by the functional commanders and is decentralized. Because of these to two 
different processes, the proposed NCW organization is looked at in two "snapshots" 
during analysis with the Organizational Consultant expert system. 
xii 
The Organizational Consultant expert system relies on a knowledge base derived 
from combined literature on organizational theory and human expertise on organizational 
design. The literature and expertise has been distilled into over 450 "if-then" statements 
which are used to analyze the organization and produce recommendations on the design 
of an organization. 
Table ES-l is a summary of results concerning the proposed NCW organization, 
along with confidence factors, which can range from 0 to 100. 
NCW Organization (planning) NCW Organization (Execution) 
SIZE Large (80) Large 
CLIMATE Developmental (76) Developmental (76) 
MICROINVOL VEMENT Low (73) Low (80) 
STRATEGY Analyzer with innovation (72) Prospector (76) 
Prospector (65) 
Current Recommended Current Recommended 
COMPLEXITY Medium (82) Low (55) Medium (82) Medium (54) 
Medium (54) High (54) 
I,.ow (51) 
HORIZONTAL DIFF. Medium (80) Low (55) Medium (80) Low (51) 
High (51) 
VERTICAL DIFF. Low (80) Low (79) Low (80) Low (59) 
High (51) 
SPATIAL DIFF. High (80) High (80) 
CENTRALIZATION Medium (81) High (50) Medium (85) Low (48) 
FORMALIZATION Medium (76) Low (71) High (76) Low (77) 
SPAN OF CONTROL Moderate (60) Narrow (58) 
-MEDIA RICHNESS High (85) High (85) 
Providing a large amount of information Providing a large amount of information 
(85) (95) 
INCENTIVES Results (85) Results (95) 
COORDINATION AND Meetings (86) Professionalization (100) 
CONTROL 
CONFIGURATION Divisional (69) Adhocracy (73) 
Matrix (62) Simple (65) 
Adhocracy (60) 
SITUATIONAL MISFITS None None 
ORGANIZATIONAL Complexity Complexity 
MISFITS Centralization Centralization 
Formalization Formalization 
Configuration 
do not match do not match 
Table 6-1. Results from Organizational Consultant. 
xiii 
Organizational Consultant had additional recommendations calling for less 
formalization with the NCW organization and empowering lower levels of the 
organization during the execution process. 
The conclusion is reached that the proposed NCW organization fits situationally 




A. PRINCIPLE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis considers the fitness of a proposed organization for the Navy, designed 
to operate in a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) environment. The proposed organization 
is centered on a force commander and four subordinate commanders (to command the 
functional groupings of Situational Awareness, Logistics, Effects, and Operations). It is 
envisioned to operate in a NCW environment, along with advanced decision support 
systems and a robust, secure network. 
The research question to be answered is: "Is the proposed organizational structure 
fit in a NCW environment?" 
As defined by Burton and Obel in the text Strategic Organizational Diagnosis 
and Design, "Fit simply means that things have to fit together" (Burton, 1998, p. 285). 
Although this may seem simple, there are many factors which go into analyzing an 
organization and ensuring proper relationships exist between the many variable necessary 
to obtain proper fit. Contingency theory is the basis for the knowledge base developed by 
Burton and Obel which examines the proper fit of all the variables. This knowledge has 
been incorporated into an expert system, Organizational Consultant, which will be used 
to analyze the proposed organization and determine its fitness. 
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B. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
There has been much debate in the last few years about whether or not the 
military is undergoing a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It has been suggested that 
for a RMA to have occurred three things need to change - technology, the operational 
concept, and lastly, organization (Welch, 1996). 
Clearly technology has dramatically changed in the last few years. Computer 
speed and capability is ever increasing and computers are becoming more and more 
integrated into society. A new operational concept, network centric warfare, has been 
proposed for the military and is being reviewed and debated by military scholars. This 
thesis proposes an organization which covers the last part of the RMA - organizational 
change. 
The operating forces of the Navy are still organized to meet a cold war threat and 
to fight a ·battle in the open ocean. This organization is the Composite Warfare 
Commanders (CWC) concept. CWC is focused around Commanders of the Air, Sea, 
Sub-surface, Strike, and SpacelElectronics functions and coordinators to manage the 
resources (ships, plane, helicopters, etc.) the commanders need to fight. As will be 
discussed, this a very platform centric way of conducting command and control. 
Today the Navy may be called upon to fight in any region of the world, from the 
littoral environment (which may extend inland over 100+ miles) to the open ocean. The 
CWC concept of the cold war has served the Navy well, but, given the geopolitical 
situation of today, we need to take advantage of the possibilities offered by new 
technologies and concepts. 
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c. TRENDS IN FUTURE WARFARE 
Whether or not we are in the midst of a RMA, warfare is changing dramatically. 
The tempo· of warfare is increasing and the ability (and demand) to coordinate and 
integrate increasingly complex military operations is itself increasing significantly 
(OSDINET Assessment, 1997). 
Information has become a prized commodity and may be the key to winning the 
next war. Major General Paul Funk, U.S. Army, stated, "If this is the information age, 
then we have to win the information war" (Johnson, 1996, p. 2). We need to be 
organized to take advantage of, and achieve, information superiority. 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), ADM Jay Johnson, has articulated his 
vision of 21 st century naval power as "to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore 
from the sea - anytime, anywhere" (Johnson, 1997, p. 48). The orgaiuzation proposed 
and analyzed here will hopefully bring the United States Navy one step closer to 
achieving the CNO's vision. 
D. IMPORTANT NOTES 
The proposed organization is focused on a maritime navy - forces at sea and the 
capabilities and effects they bring to the battle. 
This thesis does not look into the physical network and all issues associated with 
it (bandwidth, security, etc.). It assumes a robust, secure physical network is in place, 
with adequate bandwidth to link all forces. 
3 
There is no one right organization for all cases - a command and control structure 
is presented which the author believes will work in most situations to take advantage of 
new opportunities provided by NCW. Designing an organization is a difficult process. 
The "best" organizational structure and processes depends on the environment and other 
variables. Since the Navy can not change organizations to meet every situation and 
environment, an organizational design is needed which can span the entire spectrum of 
conflict (peace to war) and be adapted to the circumstances. 
The Organizational Consultant expert system software is copyrighted. However, 
to make it easier to read, the copyright symbol will not be used. 
The thesis will begin by examining characteristics of command and control 
structures and processes. Then, with the background of C2 established, examine NCW, 
followed by a proposed organization for the Navy designed to thrive in a NeW 
environment. Contingency theory will be reviewed to provide an understanding of the 
Organizational Consultant expert system. The proposed organization will then be 
analyzed using Organizational Consultant and the results will be discussed. The thesis 
will end with issues, conclusions and recommendations. 
4 
II. COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES 
Some of the issues discussed in this chapter are characteristics of a command and 
control structure and decision process. These issues are highly interrelated and need to be 
understood as they are important to consider when designing a military organization. 
A. ORGANIZATIONS 
What is an organization? "Organizations are social entities that are goal directed, 
deliberately structured activity systems with an identifiable boundary" (Jones, 1985). 
The basic building block of an organization is an individual. Individuals in the 
organization interact to perform functions and processes for the organization. The 
organization exists to accomplish a set of goals and is structured to achieve them. 
An organizational structure is "the sum total of the ways in which its labor is 
divided into distinct tasks and then its coordination is achieved among these tasks" 
(Mintzberg, 1993). How one organizes can complicate or simplify problems of execution 
(MCDP 6, 1996, p. 87). 
For efficient and effective operation of an organization, there needs to be a natural 
fit within the organization (internal consistency), the tasks or goals the organization will 
perform and achieve, and the environment within which the organization will operate. 
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B. ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS 
1. Information Processing 
A fundamental role of an organization is information processing. "An 
organization processes information in order to coordinate and control its activities" 
(Burton, 1998, p. 45). 
Information, and the processing of information, can be more precisely defined 
when it is viewed as a part of an overall cognitive hierarchy. Humans are a necessary part 
of the organization and the processing of information. Figure 2-1 shows the cognitive 






I KNOWLEDGE Correlated, fused, analyzed, displayed 
COGNITION , 
INFORMA TION Fonnatted, plotted, translated 
PROCESSING 
DATA Raw signals 
Figure 2-1. The Cognitive Hierarchy (NDP 6,1995, p. 21). 
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The first step toward understanding is gathering raw data. Raw data may be a 
visual observation, transmission of bits or bytes via a computer, or any other basic signal 
source. This data must be processed, formatted, collated, filtered, or displayed into 
information objects developed from experience and experimentation to become 
meaningful information. Information in this sense is the first form of data rapidly 
assimilated by humans. This gathered information allows us to generate knowledge 
through cognition - learning, integrating, and applying thought to the different pieces of 
information. This process modifies the original information objects and creates 
knowledge objects. Finally, by using human judgment, this knowledge can be 
transformed into understanding. Once understanding has been achieved, decisions which 
support the goals of organization can be made. (NDP 6, 1995) 
Information used by an organization is most useful when it is not tightly 
controlled (Roman, 1996). Allowing everyone in the organization to have access to' 
information, subject to security concerns, of course, allows more assimilation of 
information so understanding can be more rapidly achieved throughout the organization. 
The result is that decisions can be made quickly and efficiently by the responsible and 
empowered people in the organization. This provides the basis for integrating the diverse 
tasks being performed into a focused unity of effort. 
2. Deal with Span of Control 
Organizations, specifically the organizational structure the organization employs, 
must manage the span of control of individuals. The driver in choosing the size of the 
span of control is the limited information processing capability of individuals. 
7 
Span of control refers to both the number and types of things the responsible 
person must coordinate and control. A person may be able to handle a large number of 
items if they are all similar, but may only be able to manage a few, diverse items. The 
optimal number of items, or people, under one person's span of control is situation 
dependent. 
When the span of control is too large, the individual may be presented with too 
much information for them to process, possibly resulting in missed opportunities. 
Another person must be added to the organization to keep the span of control 
manageable. 
There is a trade off which must be made between the organization's depth (layers) 
and width (span of control). In general, narrowing a span of control means deepening the 
organization's number of layers. The more layers an organization has, the longer it takes 
for information to move up and down the formal channels, potentially resulting in a less 
responsive information processing capability. Also, more layers in an organization will 
increase the number of people that information must flow through. Each individual must 
decide what to do with that information - act on it, ignore it, or pass it on to someone else. 
Deciding to flatten an organization by removing layers of people, will decrease 
the nodes the information must pass through and increase the speed at which information 
can be processed. However, this will widen the span of control and increase the reliance 
on lateral or informal communication. (NDP 6, 1995) 
8 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The definition of Command and Control (C2), according the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
is, "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over 
assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control 
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the 
mission." (Joint Pub 1-02, 1995, p. 78) 
Command and control is both a process and a system by which a commander 
decides which actions are carried out and directs their execution. The words "command 
and control" can be viewed as nouns, and used in this way command and control 
describes a system - an arrangement of different elements interacting to produce an 
integrated action. (MCDP 6, 1996) The basic elements of a command and control system 
are people, information and the support structure to carry out command. "Command and 
control", viewed as a compound verb, describes a process - a collection of related 
activities. (MCDP 6, 1996) Viewed this way, command and control is an active process; 
something to be done. 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
. Command and control is a complex system and process. As such, it is composed 
of multiple parts, each of which must act individually according to its own circumstances 
and, by doing so, changes the circumstances affecting all other parts (MCDP 6, 1996). 
9 
.---------------------------------------------------
Effective C2 must be sensitive to changes in the interactions of competing complex 
systems, both ours and the enemy's. It is unreasonable to expect C2 to impose precise, 
predictable, and well-defined order on a complex undertaking like war. Effective C2 must 
facilitate rational decisions in the midst of chaos. C2 melds the continuous adaptation 
between competing complex systems. 
E. DECISION CYCLE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL AS A 
PROCESS 
The decision and execution cycle, pictured in Figure 2-2, characterizes the 
command and control process. (NDP 6, 1995, p. 17) 
Sense, Process 






Intent and Orders 
Situational 
Awareness 
Figure 2-2. The Decision and Execution Cycle. 
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It is based on the classic Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop and models 
each side (friendly and enemy) which meets in the environment where actions are carried 
out. The OODA loop is a simplification of a complex process, but clearly shows the 
process of command and control. 
The loop starts with gathering information about the enemy's forces (such as 
intent, capabilities and disposition), friendly forces, and the environment in which they 
operate. The next step is to evaluate that information in the context of the situation for 
which a decision is to be made. Gathered data must be timely, relevant, and useable 
(recall the cognitive hierarchy, Figure 2-1), perceptions must be validated, and 
understanding achieved. The third step is to decide what action (or no action) to take 
based on the situation. Lastly, the decision is translated into action where something is 
done in the environment - an action is taken on the battlefield. This process is continuous 
and relies on constant feedback (new observations) to ca,nyout the cycle. There can be· 
OODA loops within OODA loops for some complex decisions. 
F. ROLE OF TIME AND TEMPO OF OPERATIONS 
The Navy defines tempo as "the pace of action - the rate at which we drive 
events" (Roman, 1996, p. 9). One way of doing this is to exploit the dynamics of combat 
by maintaining a high tempo of operations. Whoever can make and affect 
implementation of decisions consistently faster, gains a tremendous, often decisive 
advantage. Decision- making thus becomes a competitive process with regard to time, 
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where timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating and controlling tempo. 
(FMFM 1, Warfighting) 
However, generating a fast tempo of operations can cause ineffective or incorrect 
decisions to be made. It is important to allow sufficient time to understand the battlefield 
and available options, so that the a high quality, yet still timely, decision can be made. 
Also, moving too fast can cause your opponent to not understand your intentions and 
miss your implied message (the hopelessness of the situation) and your intended 
manipulation of the enemy's actions may not occur. 
Alan Krulisch (1998) developed a model using a Monte Carlo simulation to 
examine speed of command versus decision quality. His conclusion is that increased 
speed of command provides increased probability of mission success, but if one must 
sacrifice quality to gain speed, any advantage can dissipate rapidly. There is a balance 
between rapid actions, risking poor quality decisions, and acting too slowly to maximize 
decision time and losing the competitive advantage. Controlling the tempo of operations 
can result in ensuring a higher likelihood that the battle unfolds in your favor. 
G. CENTRALIZED VS DECENTRALIZED CONTROL 
Control of operations can be either centralized, decentralized, or a long spectrum 
between the two . 
. Centralized control, called detailed control according to Navy doctrine (NDP 6, 
1995, p. 26), works best when there is great certainty in the environment and little time 
pressure. Detailed control can also be described as coercive - the commander holds a 
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tight rein over the organization with information flowing up to the commander and orders 
flowing down from the commander. (MCDP 6, 1996) Orders and plans are detailed and 
explicit and their success requires strict obedience, minimizing subordinate initiative and 
decision making. It has been said that the RMA may lead to pressure to centralize control 
(Fukuyama, 1997, p. 52). With technological ability increasing rapidly, the commander 
may be able to see everything subordinates see and direct their every move from 
headquarters. 
At the other end of the spectrum is decentralized, or mission, control. (NDP 6, 
1995, p. 26) Here the commander has a loose rein over the organization. The commander 
guides the actions of subordinates by imparting an understanding of mission requirements 
(commander's intent) and then allowing them freedom of action (NDP 6, 1995, p. 27). 
Mission control can be described as spontaneous - unity of effort is not the product of 
conformity· imposed from above, but from the spontaneous cooperation of all the 
elements in the organization. (MCDP 6, 1996) Lab tests indicate that teams placed under 
increased stress operate more efficiently and correctly when there is less shared 
uncertainty coupled with decentralized control (Roman, 1996, p. 6). Shared uncertainty 
can be reduced by lateral coordination or mutual. adjustment between members of the 
organization. Whether done formally or informally, coordination between different 
groups in an organization can help the flow of information and allow more efficient 
operations. This mutual adjustment keeps organization running efficiently. 
In reality, no commander will use solely either detailed (centralized) or mission 
(decentralized) control. The exact type of control will depend on a variety of factors, such 
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as the nature of the task, the operating environment, capabilities of the enemy. and the 
abilities of the organization's people. 
H. UNITY OF COMMAND 
Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, states "unity of 
command is the guiding principle of war in military command relationships." Unity of 
command necessitates that the commander should communicate with everyone involved 
in the operation. It demands that everyone in the force have an understanding of what 
their role is in the organization. The commander must articulate his vision, by means of 
the commander's intent, so that everyone in the organization is operating from the same 
basic understanding of the desired end state and how to achieve that state. Doctrine can 
play an important role in achieving unity of command. 
Unity of command is not synonymous with unit of effort. Unity of command 
facilitates unity of effort. Unity of command is an organizational concept, while unity of 
effort is an operations concept. Unity of effort can help ensure harmonious and 
coordinated action by all members of the organization. (NDP 6, 1995, p. 53) 
I. COMMANDER'S INTENT 
Commander's intent describes to subordinates the end goal they are working 
towards and under what operational constraints. It provides the big picture, or vision, to 
subordinates. It allows them to know where the commander wants to be at the end of 
certain time (T + time x). In certain situations the guidance may be very restrictive 
(detailed control). in others, very loose (mission control), depending on the stability of 
14 
the situation, experience level of the force, how well the goal can be defined and the 
political sensitivities of the operation. In either case, a well drafted intent can help ensure 
success of the operation. 
An excellent historical example of the utility of the commander's intent is 
Admiral Horatio Nelson's command of the British fleet in the early 1800s. He believed 
the best way to achieve a decisive victory was to give his subordinates a thorough 
indoctrination before the engagement (a clear commander's intent) and then allow them 
great initiative once the battle began. Admiral Nelson only used three general tactical 
flag hoist signals to maneuver the British fleet during their victory at the Battle of 
Trafalgar. (NDP 6, 1995, p. 5) His intent was clear and his subordinates knew the desired 
end state. 
Gary Klein (1998) makes a powerful argument concerning functions of the intent 
as well as important actions in developing the intent. His research documented some of 
the outcomes seen when subordinates understand the commander's intent. The two 
greatest advantages are promoting independence and improvisation. Independence in an 
organization can improve performance because there is less need for clarification. It also 
gives them a chance to make better use of their expertise and experience in anticipating 
problems, catching errors, and detecting deviations from the assumptions of the leader. 
By promoting improvisation the organization is capitalizing on the advantages of 
decentralization. People react without waiting for explicit permission. They recognize 
opportunities that were not necessarily part of the plan but contribute to its execution. 
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Understanding the intent, they can set and revise their own priorities and continue with 
tasks without pausing for receipt of the next order. 
Karl Weick (1993) published a streamlined version of five items necessary for 
communicating intent: 
• Here's what I think we face, 
• Here's what I think we should do, 
• Here's why, 
• Here's what we should keep our eye on, 
• Now, talk to me. 
Clearly, the intent helps the organization 'read the mind' of the boss. 
Commander's intent is critical for success and unity of effort. 
J. PLANNING 
Planning is an important part of the process of command and control. A plan is a 
proposed sequence of actions to transform a current state into a desired state. (Klien, 
1997) The most important function of a plan is to solve a problem. The organization is 
faced with a problem (a mission) or situation (an environment) and must determine how 
to proceed (a strategy) to achieve the desired end state. A plan will direct and coordinate 
the actions of the organization's members. 
A plan can also shape the method of thinking of the planners. Although "no plan 
ever survives first contact with enemy" (prussian Field Marshal Moltke in, MCDP 6, 
1996, p. 21), the process of putting together the plan can be just as valuable as the final 
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plan. Considering the limitations and options available and what alternatives mayor may 
not work, can prove to be valuable when the initial plan breaks down and adjustments are 
made to the operation. 
A plan can support improvisation after the operation begins. When the plan does 
not become reality, the plan, and the planning process, can make it easier to generate an 
alternate course of action that will be compatible with the actions of others. The plan 
itself can become a platform for improvisation in order to achieve the goals and mission 
of the organization. (Klein, 1997) 
A plan may be developed over a long period of time (deliberate planning) or a 
plan maybe put improvised very quickly to respond to a crisis (crisis action planning). In 
either case, a key point to remember about the planning process is that the job of the 
organization is to achieve a mission and accomplish its goals. Plans are not the end 
objective - mission success is the objective. Plans do break down and sometimes very 
quickly. It has been found that plans generated by u.s. Army division level staff will 
typically become obsolete in 5 hours, even though the planning cycle itself could take up 
to 5 'hours (Klein, 1997). A plan should serve as a useful platform for making changes 
and improvising to meet any unexpected situations. 
K. ADAPTATION 
One command and control structure will not fit every situation. The organization 
needs to be adaptable in both the structure of the organization, as well as the processes it 
17 
uses. Research has shown that superior teams have one key quality in common - the 
ability to adapt to task demands. (Serfaty, undated) 
Organizations that face highly uncertain environments, such as the Navy, need 
high levels of flexibility and adaptability to cope with the rapid changes. These 
organizations are likely to be less bureaucratic and more decentralized (Bolman, 1991). 
An adaptive structure is more effective than a bureaucratic one in improving overall 
organizational performance (Bhargave, 1992). 
In the future war fighting environment, only fast-paced, adaptive organizations 
will succeed. (Roman, 1996, p. 11) A command and control organization is needed that 
can adapt quickly in a complex environment, maintain control of the situation, and 
achieve the end goals of the organization. 
L. CONCLUSION 
The command and control characteristics and issues discussed in this chapter are 
vital to mission success. They will be used as NCW, the proposed organization, and the 
results from Organizational Consultant are described. These characteristics, affecting both 
structure and process, are highly interrelated. How one characteristic or issue is carried 
out or changed may have a profound effect on another. 
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III. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 
This chapter on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is presented to enable the reader 
to understand the warfare environment within which the proposed organization will 
operate. 
A. HOW DID NeW START? 
The first glimpse into NCW was seen in 1991 during the Gulf War, where U.S" 
interconnected forces, equipped with superior information and highly maneuverable 
weapons platforms, devastated an entrenched and immobile adversary (Iraq) in a very 
short period of time. It demonstrated a new offensive paradigm: the force that executes 
so quickly and powerfully that the enemy is left with only two options: surrender or 
annihilation (Stein, 1998a). 
NCW began to emerge in 1996 when Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski (then the . 
Director of Command Control, Communications and Computers (J-6) for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff) and Ms. Anita Jones (the Director, Defense Research and Engineering for the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense) initiated the Advanced Battlespace Information 
System Study (ABIS). This study looked at how emerging information technologies 
could be used to provide the warfighter with new and enhanced capabilities. After the 
completion of this study, ADM Cebrowski began to detail some of the tenents needed for 
NCW, and other military leaders began to discuss his vision for future warfare. 
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B. WHAT IS NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE? 
Network Centric Warfare, whose goal is to terminate conflicts very quickly and 
not allow wars of attrition to develop, is the military's response to information age 
conflicts. Information technology has changed the way our society operates and has 
changed the underlying rule set used in the business world. Information is beginning to 
emerge, as was seen in the Gulf War, as a dominant tool of war (N816, 1998). 
NCW can be defined as a system of warfare that derives its power from the robust 
networking of a geographically dispersed, but knowledgeable, force. NCW is applicable 
to all levels of warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations, and 
tactics. It is transparent to mission, force composition, and geography. (Cebrowski, 
1998) 
Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, has said of this new system of 
warfare, "... it's a fundamental shift from what we call platform centric warfare to 
something we call network centric warfare." (Cebrowski, 1998) Platform centric warfare 
is very linear - add more ships or capability and a linear result is obtained. In NCW, the 
payoff is non-linear, possibly exponential. Metcalfs Law describes the exponential 
payoff. Robert Metcalf stated "The power (value) of a network increases as the square of 
the number of nodes in the network." (Stein, 1998c) NCW is interested in connecting and 
increasing the number of nodes in the network to gain the exponential payoff of the new 
warfare system. 
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C. PRINCIPLESffENENTS OF NCW 
NCW is enabled by four interrelated supporting elements: Enhanced Situational 
Awareness,. Self-Synchronization, Speed of Command, and Offensive Distributed 
Firepower. 
1. Enhanced Situational Awareness 
Enhanced situational awareness is a prerequisite for NCW. Without it, NCW will 
not work. Enhanced situational awareness requires four things: accurate sensors, robust 
sensor fusion, information systems that support human decision making, and dominant 
operational knowledge. Situational awareness is generated by combining accurate sensors 
and a sensor fusion process which takes full advantage of technological advancements. 
Information systems must be able to take the fused sensor data and enable decisions to be 
made in the uncertain and complex battle environment. The combiIiation of accurate 
sensors, advanced fusion processes, and systems which support human decision making, 
may allow our forces to obtain dominant knowledge of the battlefield situation. We must 
know more about the environment than the enemy does so we can control and manipulate 
the environment to support our desired outcome. When these four elements are 
combined, we will have an enhanced awareness of the environmental situation. This is 
the driving need for developing a common understanding of the battlespace (N816, 
1998). 
2. Speed of Command 
Speed of command can be defined as: "The process by which a superior 
information position is turned into a competitive advantage." (Cebrowski, 1998, p. 35) 
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Speed of command allows the networked force to rapidly respond to internal direction 
and external stimuli and move quickly towards a unified goal (N816, 1998). 
Speed of command, as envisioned in NCW, will lock in our success while at the 
same time locking out enemy alternatives. We want to force the enemy to do our will; we 
want the enemy to perceive only two options: surrender (and do our will) or be 
annihilated. 
Speed of Command has three parts or phases. One, the force, having an enhanced 
situational awareness of the environment, achieves and maintains, information 
superiority. Our forces need to know more about what is going on in the environment 
than the enemy. Two, our forces, acting with speed, precision, and reach, are able to 
mass effects (not necessarily massing forces). The key is achieving the desired effect, not 
the specific forces, platforms or weapon systems used to get the effect. Lastly, after 
achieving the desired effects, the enemy's options are reduced: surrender or be 
annihilated (Cebrowski, 1998, pp. 32 and 35). 
Speed of command is all about controlling the speed or tempo of an operation as a 
result of understanding the context of the situation better than the enemy. By controlling 
the speed of command, our decision cycle (OODA loop) will function faster than the 
enemy's. This enables us to act upon the battlespace more rapidly than the enemy, who 
will not be able to keep up with our actions. 
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3. Self-Synchronization 
Self-synchronization can be defined as: "The ability of a well informed force to 
organize and synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up." (Cebrowski, 
1998, p. 35) 
This definition may seem simple, but the process can be difficult. Self-
synchronization is similar to a jazz ensemble conducting an improvisation session. Each 
of the band members knows hislher role in how the music is played and steps up for a 
solo part for a short period of time. Members communicate with each other through the 
music and subtle head, eye, or hand gestures. There may still be a leader of the group (for 
bookings and other administrative matters), but during a music session, each member is 
playing a certain role which everyone understands. 
Another analogy can be made with a soccer game. Each player has a specific role 
(a position) and there may be set plays (i.e. a comer kick) but for the majority of the game 
the environment (made up of the field, the ball, and the two teams) is constantly evolving 
and changing. Players know what to do because they have spent many hours practicing 
and interacting with each other. They adapt as the game changes, synchronizing their 
individual movements or actions with actions of teammates as each role changes during 
the game. 
In a soccer game the objective is clear - score as many goals as possible without 
having' goals scored against you. For the military to self-synchronize, the strategic 
objective will need to be just as clear. The commander will need to craft the intent so that 
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it is easily understood by everyone involved. Additionally, everyone will need to have a 
common understanding of the doctrine used by the force. 
Watfare is much more complex than a jazz session or soccer game and the costs 
are much greater. Thus, self- synchronization may be much harder to achieve. Unity of 
effort must be established, intent of the commander made clear, and rules of engagement 
must be unambiguous and applicable to the situation. 
4. Offensive Distributed Firepower 
Massing of effects, not massing of forces, is the key to Offensive Distributed 
Firepower. Sharing of information between platforms, allows the firepower of the force 
to be distributed in the most efficient manner. No longer are weapons limited by the 
range of the onboard sensors. Forces can coordinate maneuver and fires in a distributed 
fashion so that they impact the enemy where it hurts, when it hurts the most and 
capitalize on the lethal range of modern and emerging weapons. (N816, 1998) 
D. GRIDS 
Three elements make up the physical grid of NCW. The first element is a high 
performance information grid allowing ready access to all appropriate information 
sources. Second is an integrated sensor grid, closely coupled temporally to shooters and 
C2 assets. Third is a shooter grid for weapons reach, maneuver (along with precision), 
and speed of response. (Stein, 1998b) 
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1. Information Grid 
The infonnation grid is a fundamental building block of infonnation superiority. 
The infonnation grid is a "network of networks" consisting of communication paths, 
nodes, operating systems and infonnation management applications that enable network 
centric computing and communications across the force. The connectivity and computing 
capabilities of the infonnation grid enables manipulation of the sensor grid to build and 
generate battlespace awareness. 
The infonnation grid consists of both military and commercial communications 
capabilities. It supports multiple infonnation types in various modes at diverse data rates. 
Voice, data, and video can be transmitted via point-to-point or direct broadcast. The 
information grid provides for infonnation protection to assure infonnation availablity and 
integrity. The combination of these capabilities enables the infonnation grid to provide 
the warfighter with high speed access to the infonnation required (Stein, 1998b). 
2. Sensor Grid 
The sensor grid is composed of air, sea, ground, space, and cyberspace-based 
sensors. Sensor grid elements include dedicated sensors, sensors on multi-mission 
platforms, sensors employed by individual soldiers, and embedded logistics sensors. The 
sensor grid is the means used to provide the force enhanced situational awareness (Stein, 
1998b). 
The sensor grid may be reconfigured for specific missions or may remain intact 
for a long period of time. This grid encompasses the required physical elements 
(sensors), processes (most likely enabled or automated by software applications for data 
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fusion), and allows human interaction when necessary to achieve enhanced situational 
awareness. Both sensor tasking and data fusion will occur on the sensor grid. 
3. Shooter Grid 
This grid is where targets are dynamically matched with weapons by the use of 
high speed automated weapon-target pairing algorithms. These algorithms do not take 
the commanders out of the loop, rather they allow the commander to focus his attention 
on other areas and let computers do what they were designed to do - compute massiv~ 
bits of data/information at an ever increasing speed. The shooter grid enables the 
warfighter to plan and execute operations in a manner that achieves an overwhelming 
effect at a precise place and time. The shooter grid is where the intentions of the 
commander are translated into effects on the enemy and the manipulation of the 
environment. 
E. EXAMPLES OF NeW 
Even though NeW has not yet been achieved in the military, some elements and 




Using information to provide an enhanced awareness of the competitive 
market place can be seen in the business practices of Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart has used 
information to gain a competitive advantage over its competitors. Realizing that it had 
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grown past the point where it could cost-effectively synchronize supply and demand, the 
company set up an architecture consisting of a sensor grid and a transaction grid. Point of 
sale scanners, (part of the sensor grid) collect information on each transaction and this 
information is shared directly with Wal-Mart's suppliers in near real-time so that 
production and distribution can be better controlled. Originally, Wal-mart had a central 
purchasing department, but the need for this disappeared as information on sales (and 
hence re-supply) was shared with suppliers. 
All of the information from Wal-Mart's transaction grid is stored in a 
central data-warehouse and shared between Wal-Mart's regions and stores. This allows 
better awareness of the competitive retail system and allows Wal-Mart to adjust inventory 
levels between stores and adjust prices to increase sales and profits. Information is the 
key to Wal-Mart's success and advantage over its competitors. (Cebrowski, 1998) 
h. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (DMG) 
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell (DMG), a fixed-income securities market firm, 
has used information to allow an enhanced awareness of the financial market. They 
introduced an automated trading service called Autobahn which has changed the way 
they do business. 
In the old system, customers worked through DMG traders to initiate and 
complete transactions. The trader would be involved with every aspect of the trade from 
price assessment to execution. A trader could only handle a limited number of customers. 
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Since large trade customers generated more revenue, they had priority over smaller 
traders. 
In the new system, all transaction are conducted over a network via 
electronic transfer (a transaction grid). Customers (both large and small) are now aware 
of the market price in real time (enhanced situational awareness) and can complete 
transactions in seconds. This has been beneficial to both DMG and its customers. DMG 
can now handle a larger volume of trades, since traders are no longer needed, and both 
large and small customers can have their trades completed in mere seconds. Information 
leading to enhanced situational awareness has been the key to this transformation. 
(Cebrowski, 1998) 
2. Government 
a. Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS) 
The Federal Emergency Management Information System (FEMIS) is an 
example of a system that allows sharing of enhanced awareness required in emergency 
situations. 
FEMIS is an integrated system that provides planning, coordination, 
response, and exercise support for emergency management. It is an automated decision 
support system that integrates all phases of emergency management. A personal computer 
based system, it makes it possible for emergency management personnel to anticipate and 
plan for a wide variety of event conditions. Computers are linked via modems to a 
central server so that everyone on the network has access to the emergency plan and can 
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visualize, via status boards and in near real-time how the plan, and its modifications are 
progressing. Color coding makes it easy to see what actions have and have not been 
taken, and which ones are in progress. FEMIS generates a common understanding, in 
near real-time, of the emergency situation. This enhanced situation awareness allows 
relevant actions to be taken by emergency personnel. (FEMIS, 1995) 
3. Military 
NCW concepts are beginning to emerge in the military today. Two examples are 
provided below: Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), and Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense (TBMD). 
a. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
The Navy's CEC is an example of using networked information to 
increase combat power. CEC allows a contact to be tracked by one set of platforms and 
engaged by a separate platform set, without the shooting set ever having directly 
(organically) sensed the hostile contact. The contact data is placed on a sensor grid which 
is updated and shared between platforms quickly and precisely enough that the contact 
information is fire control quality (accurate and timely enough for a missile attack). The 
sensor grid is able to support an enhanced situational awareness between all networked 
participants (via the information grid) that allows shooters to initiate an engagement 
quickly and without ever having to be within organic sensor range of the target, 
contributing to force survivability as a by-product. 
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b. Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) 
Theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) is similar to CEC. While it is on 
a much larger scale (theater wide vice a tactical level), the concept is the same. As hostile 
ballistic missiles are fired, they are detected by friendly sensors and updated to the sensor 
grid. Other participants in the network use the information on the sensor grid to conduct 
an engagement via the shooter grid using targeting data provided by other platforms. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described network centric warfare and the tenents and grids 
which comprise NeW. It has shown how critical these tenents are to the success ofNCW 
and provided examples of some of these tenents. 
Due to the radical shift from platform centric warfare to NCW our current 
organizational structure will need to change. Fred Stein stated that as a result of NCW 
"Basic organizations that were optimized for traditional top-down command and control 
will have to change." (Stein, 1998c) The next chapter proposes an organization which is 
designed to thrive in a NCW environment. 
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR ANA VY ORGANIZATION IN A New 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
An organization was proposed by the author, along with Captain Michael 
LeFever, during the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (SSG) XVII 
(SSG XVII, 1998). Although this organization was developed and thought about during 
the SSG, many of the ideas presented here are different from those presented in the SSG 
report. The ideas presented here are those of the author and not necessarily of the SSG. 
This organization is designed to operate in a NCW environment. It is not 
designed for one specific mission, rather it is flexible and adaptable so it can be changed 
to suit the mission in both objectives and scale, while still retaining the same basic 
functional elements. 
It has been said that "the challenge for the U.S. military is to develop new 
organizational structures that achieve the efficiencies and creativity businesses have 
. gained in the virtual and reengineered environments, while at the same time retaining the 
elements of the traditional, hierarchical, command and control system essential for 
operations in the combat arena." (Huber, 1996, p xiii) The author believes the 
organization presented below meets this challenge as well as the new opportunities 
provided by NCW. 
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B. ORGANIZATION 
The core of the organization is no longer centered around commanders of 
platfonns (the platfonn centric view). It is focused on the functions and processes that 
the force, which obviously is still comprised of platforms, will need to self-synchronize. 
There will still be commanders of platfonns (e.g. ship commanding officers) however 
there will be a fundamental change in their roles and responsibilities. They will become, 
similar to the Chief of Naval Operations today, responsible for "manning, training, and 
equipping" the platfonn. The fighting of platforms will be done by a different 
organization. It is important to note that a ship commanding officer could be "dual 
hatted" as both the platform commanding officer and one of the functional (warfighting) 
commanders presented below. 
All of the weapons brought to the fight by a platfonn will be available for the 
entire force to use, not just for the one platfonn. We will no longer "fight the platform" 
(except in self-defense), we will take advantage of the distributed offensive firepower of 
the entire force and the combined effects the weapons bring to the fight. 
To carry out the advantages of using the distributed offensive firepower of the 
entire force, the basic organization is composed of the Force Commander, a Situational 
Awareness function, a Logistics function, an Effects function, and Operations function. 






































Figure 4-1. The Basic Organization. 
In certain situations (described later in this chapter), a Mission Commander role 
may also be activated. 
1. Force Commander 
The most obvious role of the force commander is to command the force. The 
Commander is, and should always be, responsible for the actions of the forces assigned. 
The commander has several specific roles, each a part of command: resource allocation, 
promulgation of intent, decide on courses of action, develop and maintain situational 
awareness, and perform a meta-cognitive function. 
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a. Resource Allocation 
When there is a requirement to perform any task the commander must 
allocate resources to complete the task. Resource allocation is not an easy chore because 
many times assets are scarce and they must be distributed across many tasks, all 
competing for resources. Some assets may have multiple capabilities (e.g. sensors and 
shooting). This further complicates the resource allocation function. 
b. Decides Courses of Action (COAs) 
There are numerous ways to accomplish a mission, but there may only be 
a few feasible or satisfying solutions. Generally, the staffwill generate several COAs to 
the commander using decision support systems and modeling and simulation tools. The 
commander, using these aids, will select a particular COA or a combination of COAs and 
then direct it to be carried out. This becomes the commanders intent. 
c. Commander's Intent 
As discussed in Chapter II, the commander must promulgate hislher intent 
so the forces know what end state they are striving to achieve. Without knowing the 
intent, there is no way for self-synchronization to occur. It is the understanding of the 
desired end state, not necessarily how to get there that matters, although collaborative 
planning and, in certain situations, being told how to achieve the end state, can help. 
Events on the battlefield will occur too fast for the commander to dictate 
every action - centralized control will not work. The intent enables subordinates to 
anticipate the commander's desired and take actions to implement them. 
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d. Develops and Maintains Situational Awareness 
It is imperative that the commander have the "big picture". Overall 
situational awareness must be maintained to effectively integrate and utilize the force 
elements. It is of utmost importance that the commander's staff, and the other command 
functions, provide the right information to the commander at the right time and in the 
right form. 
Information management is the key in providing situational awareness. To 
prevent overload or fixation on extraneous data a common integrated picture (CIP) must 
be developed and maintained on the net so everyone has access to consistent information. 
The Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO) of the organization is responsible for building and 
presenting this common integrated picture to the commander and the rest of the force. 
e. Meta-Cognitive Role 
In an organization there has to be someone who can step back from the 
current situation and assess how the organization is performing. Meta-cognition means 
"thinking about thinking". There is no one better than the commander (possibly with the 
Chief of Staff) to do this function. Self-critique is invaluable for improvement and 
adaptation to occur. The recognition of limitations, either your own, the staff's, or the 
. organization's is the trigger for adaptation. Correcting or mitigating them is central to 
adapta~ion. 
Meta-cognition should be addressed at two levels in the force: the staff (is 
the commander being supported effectively by the staff?) and the organization of the 
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entire force (is the force organized for efficient performance or is there a better way to do 
things?). 
2. Chief Knowledge Officer (CKO)/Situational Awareness (SA) 
The Situational Awareness (SA) function is a combination of the intelligence (the 
"2") and communications (the "6") functions of today and is commanded by the Chief 
Knowledge Officer (CKO). It is the CKO's job to manage all information in the force. 
Information will be managed as a pooled resource, with direct access controlled 
according to security control and access privileges. But the CKO is not merely a manager 
of information; the CKO is a commander. The CKO has direct command over all 
dedicated sensor systems which may reside on multi-mission platforms, like a radar on a 
ship, or may be solely dedicated to gathering situational awareness information, like 
unmanned aerial vehicles (VA V). The CKO will control these assets t~ effectively gather 
knowledge and build the enhanced situational awareness upon which the force will rely. 
To coordinate these assets on each platform, the CKO will have Knowledge Officers 
'(KO) under his command. KO are working for the CKO to build the situational 
awareness for the force. 
The CKO also maintains the CIP showing positions of friendly, enemy, and 
neutral platform and assets, as well as, any unresolved contacts. The CIP must show 
where ambiguities in contact information exist. CKO coordinates all national assets and 
brings the right information to the force from national sources. CKO identifies gaps in 
sensor and intelligence coverage and takes action with his dedicated assets to maximize 
the coverage. CKO must also be able to display where these gaps in sensor and 
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intelligence coverage exist. It is the CKO's job to maintain all communications assets, as 
well as ensure the security of those communications. CKO must protect our physical 
systems are protected from exploitation by the adversary (defensive information warfare). 
CKO also attempts to predict the enemy intent. During offensive attacks, the CKO 
performs all battle damage assessment. 
3. Chief Resources Officer (CRO)lLogistics (LOG) 
The Chief Resources Officer (CRO) is responsible for the logistics support of the. 
entire force. The CRO ensures re-supply and delivery, from the source to the user, of all 
food, munitions, parts, POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) and personnel. This re-supply 
is based on anticipated usage and actual consumption rates. If required, the CRO is 
responsible for any salvage activities or contracting actions which may need to be done in 
theater. The CRO also maintains the logistics database. 
The CRO is a commander of the logistics platforms and resources which will 
carry out re-supply of the force. On each platform is a Resource Officer (RO) who will 
carry out the direction of the CRO. 
4. Chief Effects Officer (CEFO)lEffects (EF) 
Effects is where decisions are made concerning fighting the battle which enables 
leveraging of the distributed offensive firepower of the force. The Chief Effects Officer 
(CEFO) is responsible for this process. 
The CEFO commands all the weapons and weapons systems in the force. These 
assets are the CEFOs to use in the most effective way to carry out the intent of the 
commander. 
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The CEFO relies heavily upon decision support systems to help carry out effects 
tasks. The CEFO ensures all targets are prioritized and duly targeted, coordinates all fire 
support requests, and matches the target with the most appropriate weapon. In some 
cases, CEFO will have to hold back some weapons, husband assets, to prevent too many 
weapons from being fired at one target or weapons usage rate from being too high. 
CEFO must ensure the deconfliction system is running properly and resolve any 
problems the decision support system can not handle. Besides the kinetic weapons, 
CEFO is responsible for non-lethal weapons, to include offensive IW. The CEFO 
commands all platforms that are solely dedicated to the effects process (such as 
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs» and has control over the weapons on 
multi-mission platforms. Working on each platform for the CEFO is an Effects Officer 
(EFO). 
It is important to note that the effects function is arguably the most centralized 
process. Almost all the engagement deconfliction decisions, as well as, determining what 
platform will fire, will need to be made by an automated decision support system (as 
programmed by the CEFO, based on the intent of the commander), and then broadcast on 
the network. This becomes a centralized process, with decentralized execution. Firing of 
weapons can be done remotely by the CEFO or by any EFO. 
Effects is separate from OPS, as the effects process is focused on the weapons and 
their effects and the employment of these weapons. OPS, as described below, focuses on 
the total force and the proper balance between the CKO, CRO, and CEFO. 
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5. Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Operations (OPS) 
Operations (OPS), commanded by the Chief Operating Officer (COO), is where 
the day to day execution of the force is carried out. 
The COO directs the tactical execution of the force, to include stationing of units 
which are not under the command of the CKO, CRO or CEFO. These include multi-
mission platforms performing several competing functions at once. In the case of one 
platform performing several functions, the COO takes the potentially competing 
recommendations of the CKO, CRO, and CEFO and decides the positioning of the 
force's platforms for the effective positioning of sensor, weapons, and logistics assets. 
Other functions of the COO include future force employment, the near real time 
planning and execution functions, force protection, simulation and event reconstruction 
analysis. On each platform is an Operations Officer (OPS) who works for the COO. 
c. RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ORGANIZATION 
In a platform centric view, each platform brought its weapons to the battle and 
each platform was considered as a whole. Under NCW, this changes. Now each 
individual sensor and weapon (not platform) will be considered individually and how it 
(not the platform) can contribute to the force. Weapons, and the control of each weapon, 
can be distributed throughout the force. This new perspective changes the relationships 
in the organization, and allows for capability tasking vice unit tasking. 
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1. Interaction of the Commanders 
The commanders (CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO) must work closely together and 
keep the success of the force, not just their respective functions, at the forefront when 
carrying out a mission. A commander who is not concerned about the entire force, will 
do more harm than good. We are trying to fight the force as a whole and effectively use 
the capabilities brought to the battle in a distributed fashion. 
While each command function has its own unique responsibilities, it is working, 
for the force commander and towards the commander's overall goal. CKO and COO 
have the most responsibility, while the CRO and CEFO functions are clearer and have 
less ambiguous solutions. COO makes many decisions on behalf of the commander (i.e. 
force positioning of multi-mission assets), however, if one of the other functions has very 
strong objections to the decision of the COO, they may take their case directly to the 
force commander for arbitration. 
In the case of a multi-mission platform, such as a ship, where the CKO is 
commanding the radar systems, the CEFO is commanding the weapons, the CRO is 
commanding the resources, and the COO is carrying out the mission, there will likely be 
instances where not everyone can agree. Hopefully, due to the commanders self-
synchronizing their efforts, these instances will be rare, but when they do occur, the force 
commander will need to step in and allocate the asset's resources. Allocation of assets is 
one of the roles of the commander, so if the CKO, CRO, CEFO, and COO can not agree, 
the force commander will make the ultimate decision. 
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2. Platform Commanders 
So if the force commander, CKO, CRO, CEFO, and COO are commanding the 
force, where does this leave the traditional platfonn commander? The platfonn 
commander is concerned about "manning, training, and equipping" the platfonn. The 
platfonn commander (e.g. a ship's commanding officer) still has command of the 
platfonn and is still responsible for safe navigation and safety of the crew, but now the 
platfonn commander brings the platfonn to the battle, then enables other people, either on 
board or remotely, to use all the assets on the ship. The platfonn commander must make 
sure all systems are operating properly so they can be used in the most effective manner 
across the force. 
On each platfonn the KO, RO, EFO, and OPS are working for the chief of each 
function (the CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO), see Figure 4-2, but the platform commander will 
still be involved in each process to ensure the most effective 'employment of the platfonn 
in each functional area. 
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Figure 4-2. Organizational Relationships. 
Important to point out is the one situation where the platform centric view still 
holds true: self-defense of the platform. The platform commander (ship's commanding 
officer) can override the CKO, CRO, CEFO, or COO if the platform must respond 
immediately to ensure its survivability. An exception to this maybe when the force 
commander decides that a platform may have to take a hit to protect another more 
important asset. 
D. MISSION COMMANDERS (MC) 
. The addition of mission commanders (MC), see Figure 4-3, makes the proposed 
organization flexible and adaptable. 
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Mission Commanders 
I Force commanderl 
I 
Figure 4-3. Mission Commanders. 
In Figure 4-3, the new Me is a section of the old force which has been "spun off" 
for a specific mission. In a sense, the force commander moves up a level and also 
functions as a Me for the original force (reporting to himlherself), while the new Me 
reports to the force commander. 
Mission commanders can be activated in several situations. A mission 
commander can be activated when: the complexity of a mission is high and requires 
special focus, the mission requires a unique capability, to prevent overload of the 
functional commanders (i.e. span of control is too large to handle), or forces are required 
to leave the protection afforded by mutual protection of forces close together. 
The assets, both platforms, sensors, and weapons, assigned to the mission are 
organized around the mission they are assigned. Any asset can be assigned to a mission 
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commander. It all depends on the mission and the best solution to the problem. The 
assets assigned are dedicated to the mission commander and for accomplishing the 
mission. 
The Mission Commander concept is designed to give the MC the forces needed to 
complete the sub task or mission, let the MC organize these forces, plan and execute the 
mission, and then return main force where the MC and the assigned forces revert to their 
previous roles (or new roles). 
While being adaptable to any situation, standing up a mission commander will not 
generate unfamiliar command relationships. The newly formed mission commander will 
also have a CKO, a CRO, a CEFO, and a COO, and each platform will have a KO, a RO, 
a EFO, and an OPS. Ideally, the people carrying out these roles on the platforms will not 
change, only the focus of their efforts (the new mission) will change. 
The mission commander's organization may be comprised of forces that are not 
familiar with each other, although it is best if they have worked and trained together. 
However, the functions (SA, EFF, LOG and OPS) are still the same as before the 
activation of the mission commander and relationships between force assets assigned to 
the mission commander are the same as when they were working for the force 
commander. 
Experiments carried out under the Adaptive Architectures for Command and 
Control (A2C2) program support the idea of an organization focused on a specific task. 
Previous research found that organizations had a higher level of performance if there was 
a match between the task, the environment, and the organizational design (Kemple, 1998, 
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p. 5). Also, in highly uncertain and highly dynamic environments, an organization that 
can adapt is favorable (Bowditch, 1997, p. 280). 
E. THE PROCESS OF SELF-SYNCHRONIZATION 
The following helps to examine the process of self-synchronization which an 
organization might use. Five KOs, on different platforms, are working to build the 
enhanced situational awareness upon which the force is relying. They are updating the 
CIP, monitoring systems that update the CIP, and monitoring the sensor assets which 
they control. The CKO is monitoring the KOs compliance with the CKO intent, which is 
itself based on the force commander's intent. All the KOs are communicating with each 
other using the information grid. The KOs are equal in authority as there is no hierarchy 
amongst the KOs. As one KO sees an opportunity which can be exploited, he/she either 
takes action, using assets under the KO's control, or alerts another KO of the opportunity. 
If there are disagreements amongst the KOs, or the CKO sees an opportunity which has 
not been seen, the CKO will direct one of the KOs to take action. 
While the CKO and the KOs are working on building the situational awareness, 
the CEFO and the EFOs are working on having the right assets (weapons) ready for any 
action which may be pending. The EFOs ensure that the weapons and weapons systems 
under their control are ready for combat and disposed so the offensive capabilities of the 
force are in the most effective position. In the same way there is no hierarchy amongst 
the KOs, there is none for the EFOs. Any disagreements amongst the EFOs, of which 
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should be few as decision support systems should tell the EFOs where to position the 
weapons for maximum coverage and effects, will be resolved by the CEFO. 
If there are disagreements between the KO and EFO of a particular multi-mission 
capable platform and both missions are being performed simultaneously (e.g. providing 
both sensor coverage and weapons coverage), then the OPS on each platform, working 
with the COO, will resolve the conflict. The CKO and CEFO must remember that the 
"big" picture is what matters. Some give and take between all individuals is vital as 
resources will always be in short supply. If the issue can not resolved locally, and the 
CKO, CEFO, and COO can not work together to solve the problem, the force commander 
must make the ultimate decision regarding asset allocation and utilization. 
In matters regarding the logistics function, the RO and CRO function in the same 
manner as the other functions. 
F. PLANNING AND EXECUTION PROCESSES 
Although this organization is designed to function as one cohesive unit, there are 
two distinct processes occurring within the NCW organization at the. same time; one is 
the planning process and the other is the execution process. 
The planning process is highly centralized. The force commander and his staff 
will generate the commander's intent and decide how to allocate resources. The 
individual KO, RO, EFO, and OPS have little, if any, input into this process. It is very 
centralized. 
46 
On the other hand, the execution process is very de-centralized. It is capitalizing 
on forces self-synchronizing their efforts to carry out the commanders intent. The force 
commander is not heavily involved in this process, except to monitor events, ensure that 
they meet the intent, and resolve any disputes. This is a very de-centralized process. 
Obviously there are not two distinct NCW organizations. Unity of command as 
well as unity of effort are required to carry out the mission. However, the two process 




v. CONTINGENCY THEORY AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSULTANT EXPERT SYSTEM 
A. CONTINGENCY THEORY 
Organizational theory focuses on the understanding of organizations. It is a 
multidisciplinary science with distinct viewpoints. Contingency theory is a dominant 
theme in organization theory. Contingency theory suggests that the effectiveness, 
efficiency, profitability, and viability of an organizational design is contingent or 
dependent upon such factors as size, strategy, technology, environment, and managerial 
preferences (Baligh, 1996, p. 1650). 
Figure 5-1 presents the contingency theory-organizational design model 
pictorially (Burton, 1998, p. 16). 
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Figure 5-1. Contingency Theory - Organizational Design Model 
This model is the basis for the knowledge base in the Organizational Consultant 
expert system. The knowledge base is derived from the vast contingency theory 
literature. It is used in a series of "if-then" rules to ensure proper fit Between the 
contingency factors (the "if' part) and the properties and structural configuration of the 
organization (the "then" part). Organizational Consultant uses these "if-then" rules 
according to a particular logical process to produce recommendations on the design of an 
organization. The designed structure is examined for the fit between its parts and its 
environment and also the fit between it and the existing structure. 
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1. Fit Criteria 
The organizational structure must be appropriate for the situation (or situations) it 
will operate in and the organization must also function well as a whole. The term used 
for describe these two conditions is "fit" (Baligh, 1996, p. 1653). Fit must be achieved in 
the environment and also within the organization. 
An effective and efficient organizational design needs to have a proper fit 
simultaneously throughout all the dimensions of Figure 5-1. There has to be a fit among 
the contingency factors themselves (Management style, Climate, Size/Ownership, 
Environment, technology, and strategy). This is called situational fit. There has to be a fit 
between the contingency factors, listed on the left side of Figure 5-1, and the design 
parameters on the right side of the figure. This is called contingency fit. There also has 
to be a fit among the design parameters - called design parameter fit (Baligh, 1996, p. 
1650). The final type of fit, total design, is the most demanding of all. It assumes that 
the contingency fit, situational fit, and the design parameter fit criteria have all been met 
(Burton, 1998, p. 18). All four fit criteria are necessary to obtain a useable system. 
a. Situation Fit 
Situation fit is based on the contingency factors for organizational 
structure: management style, climate, size/ownership, environment, technology, and 
strategy. To change any of these contingency factors requires a change to take place in 
either the environment or the organization. It is difficult to alter the situation fit. For 
example, one of the contingency factors is technology. For an organization to transition 
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from a situation where few technology systems being used to where many advanced 
technology systems are being used requires a great deal of effort and can change the way 
an organization functions. 
Situation fit requires that the design situation be internally consistent. 
Situational facts, which give answers to the "if' questions, must make sense. For 
example, an equivocal environment and a routine technology do not fit. There is a 
recommended design for this situation, and, since it is not being met, it is a situational, 
misfit (Burton, 1998, p 17). 
Control of situational misfits (and ensuring they continue to fit in the 
environment) is key to organizational success. Only those organizations that manage to 
identify the proper misfits and resolve them will be successful (Burton, 1998, p. 17). 
b. Design Parameter Fit 
F or each design parameter listed on the right hand side of Figure 5-1, the 
set of if-then propositions that lead to a design recommendation must fit and be in 
balance. For example, a design recommendation that the organization should be 
decentralized can be driven by a number of contingencies. Management style, climate, 
size, environment, technology, and strategy may all strongly suggest decentralization. 
However, the more likely situation is that there are also design propositions that suggest 
more centralization. Here the design propositions must be in proper relative balance to 
obtain a good fit. Certainty factors, discussed below, help obtain proper design parameter 
fit (Burton, 1998, p. 17). 
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c. Contingency Fit 
Contingency fit is the underlying organizing concept that joins together 
situation fit and design parameter fit. It explains how situation fit and design parameter 
fit are based on contingency theory and work together. Contingency fit is labeled as such 
in Figure 5-1. 
Each if-then contingency proposition must be consistent with contingency 
theory. A rule that states "If the organization is large, then the structure should be 
centralized" does not fit with what contingency theory tells us and should not be a part of 
the knowledge base (Burton, 1998, p. 16). 
Contingency fit criterion can largely be achieved by adhering to the 
contingency theory literature and translating this into appropriate if-then statements for 
the organization (Burton, 1998, p. 17). 
d. Total Design Fit 
Total fit assumes that situation fit, design parameter fit, and contingency 
fit are all in balance. Total design fit requires that the design recommendations fit 
together internally and fit the actual situation (Burton, 1998, p. 18). Total design fit is the 
reality check - it asks "can the recommendations be used in real life?" 
Even with a situational fit and a contingency fit, design parameter fit may 
not be. present. This is due to the fact that each contingency relationship may lead to 
more than one design recommendation. The right set or combination has to be chosen to 
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obtain total design fit. Total design fit may be impossible to obtain if a serious situational 
misfit exists (Burton, 1998, p. 18). 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT EXPERT SYSTEM 
Organizational Consultant is an expert system which relies on a knowledge base 
derived from a combined large body of literature on organizational theory and a body of 
expertise on organizational design. Its purpose is to help design organizations. Its 
underlying assumption is that an organizations primary role is an information processing 
one. 
Contingency theory and the "fit" criteria are the organizing concepts for the 
creation and development of the knowledge base used by Organizational Consultant. The 
knowledge base appears as a system of decision rules, or rules that generally apply under 
specific sets of circumstances. 
The knowledge base has over 450 rules. An example of a rule is proposition 5.12: 
"If the organization is large, then formalization should be high (cf20)." The cf stands for 
certainty factor and can range from -100 to 100. The certainty factor measures the degree 
of belief (or disbelief for negative certainty factors) one has in the rule statement. These 
certainty factors are set in Organizational Consultant by the developers as default values 
based on their experience and cumulative research. These certainty factors where not 
modified by the author. Certainty factors are also used in the input by the user to answer 
the questions posed by Organizational Consultant and in the recommendations provided 
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after the system has analyzed the organization. This will be covered in more detail in 
Chapter VI. 
The problem of organizational design is difficult when one considers the many 
different variables and combinations possible. For example, an organization can be 
defined as to whether it is centralized or not, formalized or not, and whether it has a 
simple, divisional, functional, or ad hoc configuration. In this situation, there are 
2x2x4=16 different possible designs from which to chose. The number of choices grows 
non-linearly as the number of organizational dimensions grows (Burton, 1995, p. 321). 
To consider all the possibilities, without the aid of a computer, would be monumental at 
best. The Organizational Consultant expert system allows the user to examine many 
different variables and possibilities in a short period oftime. 
Organizational Consultant analyzes the current organizational structure using 
many facts related to the functioning of the organization. The structure is then described 
in terms of configuration and its properties. Based on the input, the system, using the rule 
set in the knowledge base, recommends the configuration and structural properties that 
. give the best fit for the specified situation. The situation itself is analyzed and possible 
situational or organizational misfits are given. Finally, the current and prescribed 
organizational structures are compared, and possible changes are recommended. The 
system allows the user to change input values and rerun the consultation. This is a way to 
perform sensitivity analyses (Burton, 1998, p. 31). 
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More information on Contingency Theory and the Organizational Consultant 
expert system can be found in the Burton and Obel text, Strategic Organizational 
Diagnosis and Design (1998). 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION USING 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
A. INPUTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
Based on user input, Organizational Consultant recommends the structure and its 
structural properties that give the best result within the specified situation. The situation 
itself is analyzed and possible situational or organizational misfits are given. 
Inputs to Organizational Consultant are separated into twelve sections: current 
configuration, current complexity, current fonnalization, current centralization, size, 
age/ownership, diversity, technology, environment, management profile, strategy factors, 
and climate factors. 
Some of the answers to the questions posed by Organizational Consultant can be 
very subjective. For example, in the current centralization section, the question, "How 
much discretion does the typical middle manager have over hiring and firing personnel?", 
has as possible answers "no answer, very great, great, some, little, or none." What is the 
difference between some and little? The answer is very subjective. Given the same 
situation, one person may answer differently than another. "No answer" is always an 
answer if the question is not applicable. 
Confidence factors (0 to 100) are included as an input for each question to 
measure how sure the user of Organizational Consultant is in the answers to each 
question. A high confidence factor (i.e. 100) means that the user is positive in the value 
of the answer and Organizational Consultant will fully weigh the propositions associated 
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with that question. A lower confidence factor will not weigh the associated propositions 
as strongly. 
When answering the questions for the proposed organization, several assumptions 
were made by the author. There was a realistic progression of the Navy as it moved into 
the proposed structure. There were no real radical changes in the basic Navy way of life: 
there are still Officers and Enlisted personnel, salary is set on a chart as it is today, 
bonuses are paid to some people and not to others, promotions are detennined by a 
selection board (for officers) and a multiple score primarily detennines advancement for 
enlisted personnel, fitness reports and evaluations were still used. Forces are still 
commanded by a commander responsible overall for the operation and accountable for 
the forces actions. The Chief Executive of the organization is the Force Commander. Top 
Management consists of the Force Commander and the other commanders (CKO, CRO, 
CEFO, COO). Middle management are the KO, RO, EFO, OPS and platfonn 
commanders. 
Organizational Consultant expert system is designed to look at the entire 
organization. It can not consider adaptation of the organization or different processes 
within the organization. NCW has two distinct processes, planning and execution. The 
planning process is highly centralized, where the force commander is deciding on the 
intent and the overall strategy for the forces. In the execution process, the commander 
has delivered the intent and has stepped back to allow the forces to self-synchronize their 
actions. Here centralization is very low. 
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These two different "snapshots" of NCW organization, planning and execution, 
were used to answer the questions posed by Organization Consultant. Each of the two 
snapshots had a slightly different output from Organizational Consultant. 
The author will briefly review each input category and discuss the rational behind 
the input of each section, both from a planning and execution point of view. Answers to 
each question can be found in Appendix A along with the authors reasoning for each 
question. 
1. Current Configuration 
Configuration specifies the wayan organization divides work, breaks tasks into 
subtasks, and coordinates these activities. An organization can be described as simple, 
functional, divisional, a machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, adhocracy, or 
matrix configuration. 
This organization has elements of the following four configurations: functional, 
divisional, simple, and ad hoc. 
The functional configuration has unit grouping by functional specialization 
(production, marketing, finance, human resources, and so on) (ORGCON, 1998). The 
NCW organization is broken down into functional groups: Situational Awareness (SA), 
Operations (OPS), Logistics (LOG), and Effects (EFF). Each of these groups, which 
cross all platforms (divisional configuration), allows the organization to interact within 
each functional area. 
A divisional configuration has self-contained, somewhat autonomous units, 
coordinated by a headquarters unit (product, customer, or geographical grouping 
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including multinational) (ORGCON, 1998). In this configuration each platfonn is clearly 
a separate division, operating very autonomously (yet synchronizing with other 
divisions). 
The simple configuration has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and 
decision making. This is a "one man show." (ORGCON, 1998) For the NCW 
organization the force commander clearly is in charge of the planning process. On the 
execution side, the "chiefs" of each functional division are in charge of their own simple 
(flat) organization, as they are in charge of the officers on each platfonn within their 
functional area. 
The ad hoc configuration is characterized by high horizontal differentiation, low 
vertical differentiation, low fonnalization, decentralization, and great flexibility and 
responsiveness. (ORGCON, 1998) Under this configuration, forces are self-
synchronizing. Forces come together with a common purpose (a mission which is 
clarified by the commander's intent), yet they are not directed how to carry it out. The ad 
hoc body must decide among themselves how to proceed. This is the heart of self-
synchronization accomplished during the execution of a mission. 
Although there are elements of each of the four configurations in the organization, 
a simple configuration captures the essence of the NCW organization during the planning 
process while an ad hoc configuration describes the execution process. 
2. Current Complexity 
Complexity is a measure of horizontal (specialization within the organization), 
vertical (depth of the organization hierarchy), and spatial (amount of geographic 
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dispersion of the organization) differentiation. As the degree of complexity increases, the 
need for coordination and the requirement for organizational information processing 
increases (Burton, 1998, p. 69). Complexity for the NCW organization is characterized 
by 2 levels, 16 to 30 geographic locations and a moderate number of job titles. 
3. Current Formalization 
Formalization is the degree to which jobs and procedures within the organization 
are standardized, rule based, and in writing (Burton, 1998, p. 73). The greater the number 
of written rules and procedures the higher the formalization. In most studies, the 
measurement of formalization has been related to written rules (Burton, 1998, p. 73). For 
the NCW organization (being a military organization) written job descriptions are 
available for all employees. The planning process has loose compliance with standards as 
the process is carried out higher in'the organization (closer to the force commander who 
can easily change the standards). The execution process demands more compliance with 
standards and is supervised closer. 
4. Current Centralization 
Centralization is the degree to which formal authority to make discretionary 
choices is concentrated in an individual, unit, or level (usually high in the organization). 
Centralization is measured by how much direct involvement top managers have in 
gathering and interpreting the information used in decision making and the degree to 
which top management directly controls the execution of a decision (Burton, 1998, p. 75). 
For the NCW organization, top management is greatly involved with the gathering and 
interpreting of information during the planning process and not directly involved in 
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execution of these decisions. The typical middle manager has little control over 
establishing budget (usually set by outside authority), little discretion over how his or her 
unit will be evaluated, some discretion over hiring and firing personnel, and little 
discretion over rewards (salary and promotions). 
5. Size 
Size is one of the variables that influences the choice of an organizational 
structure. Size is used here as a measure of the information processing capacity. A larger 
organization requires greater information processing capacity (Burton, 1998, p. 153). An 
organization of over 2,000 is considered large by Organizational Consultant. Here the 
author assumes a large organization with 3,000 people. 
6. Age I Ownership 
Age of the NCW organization can be young, mature or old. The age of the NCW 
organization is young due to the relatively short tour lengths of military personnel, 
constant turnover, as well as the dynamic nature of individual units rotating within Joint 
Task Forces of today. Ownership of the NCW organization is public/state owned. 
7. Diversity 
Diversity is a measurement of the number of different products that the 
organization produces, the number of markets the organization competes in and the 
number of markets overseas. The NCW organization is considered to have "many" 
different products (products are considered to be different weapons types and different 
kinds of forces) and compete in "some" different markets. The question concerning 
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overseas markets was not answered as naval forces always operate overseas during 
conflicts. 
8. Technology 
Technology is the information, equipment, techniques, and processes required to 
transform inputs into outputs (Burton, 1998, p 213). The technology required to carry out 
the NCW organization is considered to be highly advanced. The major activity of the 
NCW organization is production - providing energy (via a weapon's effect), at a given: 
location, at a given time. The planning process has both routine (easy to analyze 
problems and few exceptions) and non-routine (difficult to resolve problems and many 
exceptions) technology. The execution process has primarily non-routine technology. 
9. Environment 
The environment can be described as simple or complex, by the amount of 
uncertainty in the environment, the amount of equivocality in the environment, and rating . 
the toughness of the competition. For the NCW organization (both planning and 
execution) the environment is complex, uncertainty is high, and the competition is 
extreme. The equivocality of the planning process is higher than the execution process, as 
the force commander is trying to determine what course of action to follow, often without 
knowing specific adversary or engagement locations and intentions. 
10. Management Profile 
Management profile is concerned with the question of whether management or 
leadership style affect the choice and fit of the organizational structure. The 
Organizational Consultant questions in this section concern types of decisions made by 
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top management, the level of information used to make these decisions, a proactive or 
reactive approach to taking action, and the top management's attitude towards risk. The 
NCW organization is characterized' by top management making policy and general 
decisions, long term decisions, being risk neutral, and taking proactive actions. During 
the planning process top management will use very detailed information to make 
decisions, while during the execution process only aggregate information as they will not 
be heavily involved in the execution process. 
11. Strategy Factors 
Strategy is the determination of the basic long term goals of an organization, the 
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out 
these goals (Burton, 1998, p. 248). The NCW organization was characterized as having a 
high capital requirement, medium product innovation, medium process innovation, and 
high concern for quality. 
12. Climate Factors 
The organizational climate refers to the beliefs and attitudes held by individuals 
about their organization. The climate is a relatively enduring quality of an organization 
that is experienced by employees and also influences their behavior (Burton, 1998, p. 
113). Climate questions were answered in the best possible, yet still realistic, manner, 
indicating high trust, medium conflict within the organization, high morale, a moderately 
equitable rewards system, high leadership credibility and low scapegoating. 
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B. RESULTS FROM ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
Organizational Consultant, as described in Chapter V, uses the knowledge base of 
over 450 "if-then" statements to analyze the organization. Organizational Consultant also 
provides written comments about why a particular conclusion was reached. 
Recommendations are made with a certainty factor associated with them. In the 
conclusion, certainty factors may take any value between -100 and +100. The higher the 
numerical value of the certainty factor, the stronger the conclusion. In general, certainty 
factors between 0 and 30 indicate a low certainty, 30 to 60 indicate medium certainty, 
and 60 or above indicates high certainty. Above 80, the recommendation is almost 
certain. 
Sensitivity analysis can also be performed to analyze a questionable result more 
closely. Changing the answers to one or two questions can change the results and 
conclusions of Organizational Consultant. This can provide valuable insights into the 
organization. 
Table 6-1 is a summary of results from Organizational Consultant. 
NCW Organization (Planning) xecution) NCW Organization (E 
SIZE Large (80) Large (80) 
CLIMATE Developmental (76) Developmental (76) 
MICRO~OLVEMENT Low (73) Low (80) 
STRATEGY Analyzer with innovation (72) Prospector (76) 
Prospector (65) 
Current Recommended Current Re commended 
COMPLEXITY Medium (82) Low (55) Medium (82) M edium (54) 
Medium (54) Hi gh (54) 
Lo w (51) 
HORIZONTAL DIFF. Medium (80) Low (55) Medium (80) Lo w (51) 
Hi gh (51) 
VERTICAL DIFF. Low (80) Low (79) Low (80) Lo w (59) 
Hi gh (51) 
SPATIAL DIFF. High (80) High (80) 
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CENTRALIZATION Medium (81) High (50) Medium (85) Low (48) 
FORMALlZA TION Medium (76) Low (71) High (76) Low (77) 
SPAN OF CONTROL Moderate (60) Narrow (58) 
MEDIA RICHNESS High (85) High (85) 
Providing a large amount of information Providing a large amount of information 
(85) (95) 
INCENTIVES Results (85) Results (95) 
COORDINATION AND Meetings (86) Professionalization (100) 
CONTROL 
CONFIGURATION Divisional (69) Adhocracy (73) 
Matrix (62) Simple (65) 
Adhocracy (60) 
SITUATIONAL MISFITS None None 
ORGANIZATIONAL Complexity Complexity 
MISFITS Centralization Centralization 
Formalization Formalization 
Configuration 
do not match do not match 
MORE DETAILED 1) You may consider decreasing the 1) You may consider decreasing the 
RECOMMENDATIONS number of positions for which job number of positions for which job 
descriptions are available. descriptions are available. 
2) You may give supervisors and middle 2) You may give supervisors and middle 
manager fewer rules and procedures. manager fewer rules and procedures. 
3) Managerial employees may be asked 3) Managerial employees may be asked 
to pay less attention to written to pay less attention to written 
instructions and procedures. instructions and procedures. 
4) You may consider fewer written job 4) You may consider fewer written job 
descriptions. descriptions. 
5) Top management may control the 5) Middle managers maybe given more 
execution of decisions more actively. discretion over evaluations. 
6) The typical middle manager may be 6) The typical middle manager may be 
given less discretion over how work given more discretion over personnel 
exceptions are to be handled. rewards. 
7) Middle managers may be given more 
discretion over establishing budgets. 
8) The typical middle manager may be 
given more discretion over establishing 
a new program or project. 
Table 6-1. Results from Organizational Consultant. 
Detailed results from Organizational Consultant are in Appendix B for the 
planning process for the NCW organization and in Appendix C for the execution process. 
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Below, each result and the recommendation from Organizational Consultant is discussed. 
Remarks are taken from the Organizational Consultant results in Appendix B or C. 
1. Size 
The NCW Organization, for both the planning and execution process, is 
considered a large organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your 
organization's size is large (cf 80). Between 51 and 75 % of the people 
employed by NCW Organization have a high level of education. 
Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is 
greater than 2,000 and NCW Organization is categorized as large. 
2. Climate 
The organizational climate is the summary measure of people and behavior. Both 
the planning and execution processes of the NCW organization have a developmental 
climate. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the 
organizational climate is a developmental climate (cf76). 
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, 
entrepreneurial and creative place to work. People stick their. necks out and 
take risks. The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers. The 
glue that holds organizations together is commitment to experimentation 
and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. Readiness 
for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's 
long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success 
means having unique and new products or services and being a product or 
service leader is important. The organization encourages individual 
initiative and freedom. 
The rationale behind the recommendation is: 
When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is 
likely that the organization has a developmental climate. Employees with a 
high morale is frequently one element of a developmental climate. 
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Moderately to high equitable rewards in the organization drives the 
climate towards a developmental climate. Medium to high leader 
credibility characterizes an organization with a developmental climate. An 
organization with a medium level of scapegoating may have a 
developmental climate. 
3. Micro-involvement 
Micro-involvement is a leadership characteristic, not an organizational 
characteristic. The level of management's micro-involvement in decision making is the 
summary measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for micro-
involvement; managers have a high preference for micro-involvement (ORGCON, 1998). 
The NCW Organization management profile, during the planning process, has a 
low preference for micro-involvement (cf 73). The execution process also has a low 
preference for micro-involvement, but with a higher confidence factor (cf 80). 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning for low micro-involvement by the NCW 
organization was: 
The management of NCW Organization has a preference for 
delegating decisions. This will lead toward a low preference for micro-
involvement. Management has a long-term horizon when making 
decisions, which characterizes a preference for a low micro-involvement. 
The management ofNCW Organization has a preference for taking 
actions when making decisions. This will lead toward a low preference for 
micro-involvement because meeting the problems before they arise allow 
you to work on the general level and not being consumed with the very 
detailed decisions that can best be made at lower level in the organization. 
Management has a preference for motivating people and not using 
. control which will lead toward a low preference for micro-involvement. 
The execution process had an additional reason for a low level of micro-
involvement: 
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Since the management has a preference for making decisions on 
the basis of very aggregate information a low preference for micro-
involvement characterization is appropriate. 
4. . Strategy 
The organization's strategy is categorized, following Miles and Snow's (1978) 
typology, as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without 
innovation, defender, or reactor. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an 
analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. (ORGCON, 1998) 
Organizational Consultant concluded that for the planning process the current 
strategy is likely an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 72), however, it could also be a 
prospector strategy (cf 65). Based on the answers provided for the execution process, the 
NCW organization's current strategy is likely a prospector strategy (cf76). 
An analyzer with innovation strategy is for an organization that combines the 
strategy of the prospector and the defender. It moves into the production of a new 
product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. (ORGCON, 1998) 
The prospector strategy is for an organization that continually searches for market 
opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and 
uncertainty to which it competitors must respond. However, because of its strong concern 
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for product and market innovation, a prospector is usually not completely efficient. 
(ORGCON, 1998) 
A defender strategy is for an organization that has a narrow product market 
domain. Top managers in this type of organization are experts in their organization's 
limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their domains for new 
opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make 
major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead they 
devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations. 
(ORGCON, 1998) 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind an analyzer with innovation 
strategy for the planning process is: 
For a medium routine technology, NCW Organization has some 
flexibility. It is consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With 
a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely 
strategy for NCW Organization. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning for a prospector strategy, for both the 
planning and execution process is: 
F or a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development 
or market opportunities exploitation, it requires a high capital investment. 
NCW Organization has numerous products. A prospector is constantly 
seeking new product opportunities to serve the existing and potentially 
new customers. With a concern for high quality a prospector strategy is a 
likely strategy for NCW Organization. With top management preferring a 
relatively low level of micro-involvement, the strategy is likely to be 
prospector. 
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There was an additional statement for the reasoning behind the conclusion for the 
execution process: 
A non-routine technology is likely to be costly for NCW 
OrganiZation, and a prospector strategy of new product development 
where margins are likely to be high is very reasonable. 
The author agrees with the strategy types assigned by Organizational Consultant. 
The planning process has experts in their respective areas and is concerned with 
efficiencies (defender strategy). It also searches for new opportunities and wants to be the 
creator of change, creating uncertainty for the enemy. Also, the planning process will 
most likely not try out new products until their viability has been shown (analyzer with 
innovation strategy). 
The execution process is looking for new opportunities to exploit, is the creator of 
change, and desires to create uncertainty for the enemy (prospector strategy). 
5. Complexity 
Organizational complexity is the combined degree of horizontal, vertical, and 
spatial differentiation. 
The current horizontal differentiation, in both planning and execution, is medium 
(cf 80). It is recommended to be low (cf 55) for the planning process and either low (cf 
51) or high (cf 51) for the execution process. 
The current vertical differentiation, in both planning and execution, is low (cf 80) 
and matches the recommended low level (cf 79 for planning and cf 59 for execution). The 
execution process could also have a high level of vertical differentiation (cf 51). 
Spatial differentiation is high (cf 80) for the NCW organization. 
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Organizational Consultant concluded that the current organizational complexity is 
medium for both the planning and execution processes (cf 82). Organizational consultant 
is split, with very close confidence factors, for the recommended level of organizational 
complexity. F or the planning process the recommended degree of organizational 
complexity is low (cf 55), however, it could also be medium (cf 54). For the execution 
process the recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 54), high 
(cf54) or low (cf5t). 
The reasoning behind a low level of complexity is: 
Not much is known about the environment since both the 
environmental uncertainty and the environmental equivocality of NCW 
Organization are high. In this situation, the organizational complexity 
should be low. This allows the organization to adapt quickly. When the 
environmental hostility of NCW Organization is high, organizational 
complexity should be low. 
The reasoning behind a medium level of complexity is: 
Large public organizations should have medium to high 
organizational complexity. NeW Organization has a technology that is 
somewhat routine, which implies that the organizational complexity 
should be medium. Because NeW Organization has an advanced 
information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could 
otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization requires a medium 
level of complexity. 
Finally, the reasoning behind a high level of complexity, only for the execution 
process, is: 
New Organization has a prospector strategy. Then, the 
organizational complexity should be either low or high. NCW 
Organization has a non-routine technology, which implies that the 
organizational complexity should be high. Top management of NCW 
Organization has a preference for a low level of micro-involvement, which 
allows for a higher organizational complexity. Because NeW 
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Organization has an advanced infonnation system, organizational 
complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. Since the size of NCW 
Organization is large and NCW Organization has a non-routine 
technology, the complexity should be high - particularly the vertical 
differentiation. 
With such close confidence factors, low (55) and medium (54) for the planning 
process, and medium (54), high (54) and low (51) for the execution process, the author 
concludes that a medium level of complexity is probably the best level for the NCW 
organization. The organization was not designed to be complex, rather it was designed to 
minimize the number of interactions, and repeat the basic functions (SA, LOG, EFF, 
OPS) on each platfonn. 
6. Centralization 
Centralization is measured on two main factors: 1) how much involvement top 
managers have in gathering and interpreting the infonnation they use to make decisions; 
and 2) the degree to which top management directly controls the execution of the 
decision. 
For both the planning (cf 81) and execution (cf 85) process the current 
centralization is medium. The recommended levels of centralization are, as expected, 
high (cf 50) for the planning process and low (cf 48) for execution. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind high centralization for the planning 
process is: 
When there is a high capital requirement and the product 
innovation is medium, as is the case for NCW Organization, 
centralization should be rather high to obtain efficiency. When the 
environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt 
action and centralization must be high. Because NCW Organization has an 
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advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could 
otherwise. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind low centralization for the execution 
process is: 
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. A low centralization 
is required so that the organization can react and innovate quickly. Large 
organizations should have low centralization. Since NCW Organization 
operates in a complex environment and knows only some of the factors 
that affect the organization and when the values of the factors are 
relatively unstable, centralization should be low. Low centralization can 
be allowed when top management has no desire for micro-involvement. A 
developmental climate in the organization requires a medium to low level 
of centralization. 
These results are expected as the planning process is highly centralized, with the 
force commander deciding upon the intent. On the other hand, the execution process is 
very de-centralized with forces self-synchronizing their efforts, based on the 
commander's intent. 
7. Formalization 
Formalization is the degree to which jobs and procedures within the organization 
are standardized, rule based, and in writing. 
The current formalization is medium (cf76) for the planning process and high (cf 
76) for the execution process in the NCW organization. 
Organization consultant recommends a low degree of formalization (cf71) for the 
planning process: 
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important 
is not known and since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no 
efficient rules and procedures can be developed, which implies that NCW 
Organization's formalization should be low. When environmental hostility 
is high formalization should be low. Low formalization is consistent with 
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top management having a low preference for micro-involvement. A 
developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of 
formalization. 
Organization consultant also recommends a low degree of formalization (cf 77) 
for the execution process, but for different reasons: 
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. A low formalization 
is required so that the organization can react quickly. Low formalization is 
also required because of the need for innovations. Organizations with non-
routine technology should have low formalization. When environmental 
hostility is high formalization should be low. Low formalization is 
consistent with top management having a low preference for micro-
involvement. A developmental climate in the organization requires a low 
level of formalization. 
The author agrees that formalization will need to be lowered in the NCW 
organization. There will still need to be some formalization, to keep reports and 
interactions standard, however overall formalization in the NCW organization should be 
low. 
8. Span of Control 
Due to information networking and force self-synchronization, the author believes 
that a large (high) span of control could be obtained in the NCW organization. 
However, Organizational Consultant recommends that the span of control should 
be moderate (cf 60) during planning and narrow (cf 58) during execution: 
Since NCW Organization (planning process) has some technology 
routineness, it should have a moderate span of control. 
and 
Since NCW Organization (execution process) has a non-routine 
technology, it should have a narrow span of control. 
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The underlying factor in determining span of control is the routineness of the 
technology. Recall that the planning process had "some" technology routiness - both easy 
to analyze problems and few exceptions (a routine technology) and difficult to resolve 
problems and many exceptions (non-routine technology) - while the execution process 
had non-routine technology. Clearly, the level of technology routineness does not capture 
the concept of self-synchronization. 
This may indicate that the large span of control, envisioned by the author, is too 
difficult. The NCW organization may need more "middle managers" in the organization 
or more Mission Commanders when the span of control is too great for the force 
commander. It may also indicate that the CKO, CRO, CEFO, COO will need to do more 
to allow the force commander a wider span of control. 
9. Media Richness 
The NCW organization should use media with high media richness 
(cf 85). The information media that NCW organization uses should 
provide a large amount of information (planning - cf 85, execution - cf 
95). 
Large amounts of information will need to be processed in the NCW organization. 
The right information, with the desired level of detail, must be available to the right 
person, at the right time, and in the right format for ease of understanding and decision 
making. 
10. Incentives 
Incentives should be based on results (planning - cf 85, execution -
cf95). 
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Results are what matter in warfare. However, it is the results of the entire force, 
not just one individual or unit grouping, that matter. The needs of the force and its 
effective utilization must be the driving factor for everyone in the organization. 
11. Coordination and Control 
Organizational Consultant recommends meetings as the means for coordination 
and control (cf 86) during the planning process. 
When the environment of NCW Organization has high 
equivocality, high uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and 
control should be obtained through integrators and group meetings. 
Coordination within each division is very important. Coordination 
between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top management, which 
is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds between 
(among) the divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing 
technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison 
managers and technology committees are possible coordination 
mechanisms. Conferences among technical professionals can be very 
effective. When the organization has a developmentai climate, 
coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. 
During execution, however, professionalization (cf 100) should be used for 
coordination and control. 
With a non-routine technology NCW Organization should obtain 
coordination and control via group meetings. When NCW Organization's 
environment has medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and high 
complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through 
integrators and group meetings. An open organizational climate and team 
spirit must be fostered. Information must be shared among all levels. 
Constructive conflict on 'what to do' will be usual. Individual tolerance of 
ambiguity and uncertainty will be necessary. Individual performance 
evaluation will be problematic and largely subjective. Mutual adjustments 
of 'give and take' will be the norm. Frequent informal meetings and 
temporary task forces will be the primary coordinating devices. When the 
organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained 
using planning, integrators and meetings. 
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These supportive comments for professionalization are what one would expect for 
a self-synchronizing force. Professionals are trained to behave in a standardized way. 
From an information-processing point of view, professionals with skills can process more 
information than less skilled employees (Burton, 1998, p. 158). 
12. Configuration 
The most likely configuration for the planning process is be divisional (cf 69), 
matrix (cf 62) or an adhocracy (cf 60) configuration. For the execution process, the 
configuration is likely either an adhocracy (cf 73) or simple (cf 65) configuration. 
The following is a description of each of the four possible configurations: 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained 
unit grouping into relatively autonomous units coordinated by a 
headquarters, (product, customer, or geographical grouping). 
A matrix structure is a structure that assigns specialists from 
functional departments to work on one or more interdisciplinary teams that 
are led by project leaders. Permanent product teams are also possible. A 
dual hierarchy manages the same activities and individuals at the same 
time. 
An adhocracy organization is normally an organization with high 
horizontal differentiation, low vertical differentiation, low formalization, 
decentralization, and great flexibility and responsiveness. 
A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singUlar head for 
control and decision making. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind recommending a divisional 
configuration for the planning process is: 
When the organization is large, the configuration can be a 
divisional configuration. Because the organization has many products, the 
configuration should be divisional. The divisionalization of NCW 
Organization may be based pn products or product groups. Because the 
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technology is not fully divisible, care should be taken in recommending a 
divisional configuration. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind recommending a matrix 
configuration for the planning process is: 
When NCW Organization has many products or markets, a matrix 
configuration is a likely configuration. When NCW Organization's 
environment has neither low equivocality nor low complexity, the 
configuration should be matrix. When NCW Organization is large, the 
configuration . can be a matrix configuration. An organization with a 
developmental climate could have a matrix configuration. 
Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind recommending an adhocracy 
configuration for the planning and execution process is: 
An adhocracy configuration is appropriate when neither the 
environmental equivocality of NCW Organization nor the environmental 
uncertainty is low. NCW Organization has many products or many 
markets which indicates that an adhocracy is an appropriate configuration. 
When the organization is also young, the conclusion that it should bean 
adhocracy is further strengthened. Since top management has a low 
preference for micro-involvement, the ad hoc configuration is feasible. 
However, the size of the organization is not very important for the choice 
of an adhocracy configuration. 
Finally, Organizational Consultant's reasoning behind recommending a simple 
configuration for the execution process is: 
The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is 
that the organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme 
environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond 
. consistently and rapid to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a 
'simple configuration. A prospector like NCW Organization can be 
configured as a simple organization. 
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Interesting to note is that the anticipated configuration, adhocracy, was 
recommended for the execution process. An adhocracy is the heart of the self-
synchronization process. Forces mutually adjust to each other. 
On the other hand, the anticipated configuration for the planning process, a simple 
configuration, was not recommended. This is due to the fact that there are many products 
in the planning process of the NCW organization and a divisional configuration is best 
suited for a production process. 
As discussed at the end of Chapter IV, even though there are two distinct 
processes occurring within the organization, there is still only one NCW organization. 
Changing between configurations (divisional in the planning process and an adhocracy in 
the execution process) will be difficult. A mix of both divisional and adhocracy 
configurations will be required. 
c. MISFITS 
Organizational Consultant describes two type of misfits - situational and 
organizational (design parameter). Situational misfits occur when the design situations 
are not internally consistent, e.g. Organizational Consultant's recommendations for a 
highly equivocal environment are not consistent with those for a routine technology. 
Organizational misfits exist whenever the level of an organization design parameter 
differs significantly from the level recommended by Organizational Consultant. (Burton, 
1998, p 392) 
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1. Situational Misfits 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the 
contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, 
climate, and strategy. There are no situation misfits (cf 100). 
This indicates that a high level of internal consistency exists, both in the planning 
and execution processes of the proposed NCW organization, between the contingency 
factors for organizational structure (strategy, size, ownership, technology, environment, 
and management preferences) .. There is a fit between the NCW organization, both in 
planning and execution, and the multiple contingency factors. 
2. Organizational Misfits 
While there were no situational misfits, there were organizational misfits in both 
the planning and execution processes of the NCW organization in the categories 
complexity, centralization, and formalization. Configuration was also an organizational 
misfit for the planning process of the NCW organization. 
The current organizational complexity was medium for both the planning and 
execution process. The recommended configurations all had very close confidence 
factors (low (cf 55) and medium (cf 54) for planning and medium (cf 54), high (cf 54), 
and low (cf 51) for execution) indicating that anyone may be the best configuration. As 
discussed earlier, it is the authors opinion that a medium level of organizational 
complexity is best for the NCW organization. 
Centralization was recommended to be high during the planning process or low 
during execution. These results were expected for the NCW organization. What was not 
expected was centralization to be characterized as medium for the current situation. 
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Centralization was expected to be high during planning and low during execution for the 
current situation (as Organizational Consultant recommended). This difference, between 
current and recommended centralization, caused centralization to be identified as an 
organizational misfit. 
Formalization was recommended to be low in the NCW organization but 
characterized as either medium (planning) or high (execution) in the current organization. 
This is an area where the Navy will need to change. Formalization should be low. Due to 
the anticipated environmental hostility (high), the Navy will need to change the formality 
of the organization and allow more independent actions, rather than rigid following of 
procedures and rules. Procedures and rules have their place, but creativity and looking at 
situations in new ways will become paramount. 
The configuration was an organizational misfit only for the planning process. The 
author characterized the best configuration to be a simple one during the planning . 
process. Organizational Consultant recommended either a divisional, matrix, or 
adhocracy configuration, hence the misfit. 
D. MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS 
Organizational Consultant had a number of additional recommendations for the 
NCWorganization. 
Common to both the planning and execution process were four recommendations: 
• "You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job 
descriptions are available." 
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• "You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures." 
• "Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written 
instructions and procedures." 
• "You may consider fewer written job descriptions." 
These recommendations call for less formalization within the New organization. 
This agrees with previous discussions concerning lowering the level of formalization in 
the NeW organization and the Navy. 
There were two additional recommendations for the planning process: 
• "Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively." 
• "The typical middle manager may be given less discretion over how work 
exceptions are to be handled." 
These recommendations call for more centralization during the planning process, 
clearly desired in the New organization. 
There were four more recommendations for the execution process of the New 
organization: 
• "Middle managers may be given more discretion over evaluations." 
• "The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over personnel 
rewards." 
• "Middle managers may be given more discretion over establishing budgets." 
• "The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over establishing a 
new program or project." 
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Each of these recommendations calls for empowering the lower levels of the 
NCW organization during execution. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Is the proposed Command and Control structure fit in a NCW environment? Does 
the organization have a total design fit, where the situation fit, design parameter fit, and 
contingency fit are all in balance? 
The NCW organization fits situationally and with several changes, can fit 
organizationally as well, thereby obtaining total design fit. There were no situational 
misfits and each of the organizational misfits can be resolved for the NCW organization. 
The NCW organization will need to change in several categories and each change will be 
good for the NCW organization. The NCW organization will need to have a medium 
level of organizational complexity, high centralization during the planning process and 
low centralization during execution, low formalization throughout the NCW organization, 
and adopt a different configuration during the planning process. 
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VII. ISSUES, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. ISSUES 
When adopting a new organization there are major issues to confront. Change is 
never easy and there is always the inertia of the status quo to overcome. But if one does 
not think about the impacts and experiment with proposed solutions, total success of the 
organization will never be achieved. In adopting this new organization there are some 
maj or issues to confront. 
1. Cultural 
Cultural barriers are debatably the hardest ones to overcome. Adopting this new 
organization will require significant shifts in organizational culture. It calls for new 
commanders with new responsibilities. This will mean that the traditional roles of a 
ship's commanding officer will change. Convincing the "navy traditionalist that this 
change is for the better and will result in a stronger, more robust force, will be difficult. A 
strong case, based on results of experiments and war games, will be required to prove that 
this organization is effective and efficient in the NCW environment. 
2. Trust 
Trust is an important issue to consider. Both trust by the force commander in the 
lower level commanders and sailors, but also trust by the lower level commanders and 
sailors in the force commander. Forces will not self-synchronize if their actions are being 
excessively questioned by the commander. Platform commanders will also have to trust 
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that their protective safety and the effective use of their assets (sensors and weapons) is 
being accomplished by the functional commanders. 
3. Training 
Training forces as a whole, planning operations together, and fighting as one 
entity, not separate platforms, will be key to the NCW organization's success. Teamwork 
and understanding the commander's intent will greatly enhance the forces' performance. 
Grooming a cadre of personnel capable of performing the overarching functions is 
necessary. They need to be tracked from the very beginning of their careers with a 
detailed career path of schools and sequential job assignments. It is the only way that the 
force will be experienced enough within each functional area to exercise a large span of 
control. 
4. Joint 
This organization is designed for the Navy. What about the Marine Corps, Army, 
and Air Force? Will the other services be able to operate with the Navy in this structure 
or will they need to adopt a similar structure to allow coordination amongst the services? 
Experimentation, both by the Navy and other services, will be required to see if this 
organization is compatible with the evolving structures of other services. 
5. Coalition 
Can we operate with coalition partners in a NCW environment? Will we need to 
provide them equipment (and money for the capital requirements) so they can be part of 
the network? Will our speed of command be so fast that we will leave our coalition 
partners out of the fight? These are major questions which need to be addressed by the 
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Navy's senior leadership, as NCW is developed, regardless of whether or not the 
proposed organization is adopted. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Organizational Consultant 
The Organizational Consultant expert system, while a useful tool for analyzing 
organizations, could be improved. 
Organizational Consultant is based on research conducted in the civilian world. . 
The military environment is unique. While many of the lessons learned from the civilian 
world do apply in military situations, there may be some that do not. A military version 
of Organizational Consultant would be useful. 
It was hard for Organizational Consultant to capture the total organization and the 
adaptability that is envisioned. The flexibility that Mission Commanders provide to the 
organization and how it can adapt was not fully captured by Organizational Consultant. 
Organizational Consultant only provides a static snapshot of the organization. The 
adaptive process and structure of the NCW organization was not fully captured in 
Organizational Consultant. 
Finally, it can be difficult to understand how a change in one input changes the 
output of Organizational Consultant. The capability to understand, perhaps visualize in a 
flowchart, the complex interactions analyzed by Organizational Consultant would be 
helpful. 
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2. Experiments and War Games 
Experiments and war games are the first step to validating this, or any other, new 
organizational structure. The Navy's new Maritime Battle Center in Newport, Rhode 
Island, is the place where this organization could be analyzed and explored in depth. 
Toward the end of the experimental stage, actual implementation in a Fleet Battle 
Experiment would either verify the organization's concepts or prove them unfeasible. 
New organizational structures need to be experimented with by fleet participants. 
3. Future Research 
There is still much research to be conducted in exploring organizations for the 
network centric environment. Some possible topics include: 
• Are there better organizational structure for NCW? 
• What are the details of the process of self-synchronization? How is self-
synchronization executed? 
• What is the maximum span of control in a network centric environment? 
• Which processes can have low formalization and which ones need to remain 
high? 
• What effect does NCW have on coalition partners? Can we operate with them 
in a network centric world? 
C. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether this organization is adopted for further exploration or not, a 
fresh look at organizational structures for the NCW environment is useful. This thesis, 
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and the conclusion that the proposed organization can be made to fit organizationally, is 
one step in that direction. Brigadier General J.P. Kiszely has stated that "without 
originality; let alone genius, the new technologies will merely be grafted onto existing 
organizations and doctrines in a way designed to cause the least inconvenience and least 
unpleasantness in peacetime. The risks of having operated on this principle in the past are 
as nothing to the dangers of doing so in the future." (Roman, 1998, p. 2) The United 
States Navy must find, and adopt, an organizational structure which is efficient and 
effective for the network centric warfare environment. 
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APPENDIX A: INPUTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
New Organization (Planning) inputs are in bold. NeW Organization 
(Execution) inputs are in italics. Where the inputs are the same for both planning and 
execution within the NeW Organization the answers are bold and italics. 
Current Configuration 










Certainty Factor: 75 
A simple configuration is best for the planning process as the force commander is in 
charge of the highly centralized process. For the execution process, an adhocracy is the 
best configuration as an adhocracy captures the essence of self-synchronization best. 
Current Complexity 







Certainty Factor: 80 
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Certainty Factor: 80 
All Officers hold advanced degrees and most enlisted personnel have "A" and "C" school 
experience as well as many years of specialized on the job training. 
3. How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees 
working at the bottom of the organization? 
No answer 
1 or2 
3 to 5 
6to 8 
9to 12 
more than 12 
Certainty Factor: 80 
In this structure, the Force Commander has the "Chiefs" (CKO, CEFQ, CRO, COO) and 
the KO, RO, EFO, OPS working for him. This is two levels. The author is not counting 
the levels not involved in the decision making process (i.e. engineers working on a ship). 
4. What is the average number of vertical levels for the organization? 
No answer 
10r2 
3 to 5 
6 to 8 
9 to 12 
more than 12 
Certainty Factor: 80 
See question three, above. 
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5. Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where 
organization members are employed? 
No answer 
lor2 
3 to 5 
6 to 15 
16 to 30 
more than 30 
Certainty Factor: 80 
This number includes each platfonn as a separate location. 
6. What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's 
main center? 
No answer 
Less than 10 miles 
11 to 100 miles 
101 to 500 miles 
501 to 3500 miles 
more than 3500 miles 
one site 
Certainty Factor: 100 
Although forces will be dispersed, they will likely be within 500 miles of each other. 
7. What proportion of the organization's total work force are located at these 
separate units? 
No answer 
Less than 10% 
11 to 25% 
26 to 60% 
61 to 90% 
more than 90% 
one site 
Certainty Factor: 80 




1. Written job descriptions available for? 
No answer 
none 
operating employees or top management 
operating employees and first line supervisors 
operating employees, lower and middle management 
all employees, excluding senior management 
all employees, including senior management 
Certainty Factor: 100 
Everyone in the military has ajob description (although some are much more descriptive, 
and useful, than others). 
2. Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to 







Certainty Factor: 80 
The planning process has less compliance with standards as it is carried out higher in the 
organization (closer to the force commander who can easily change the standard). The 
execution process has more compliance with standards and is supervised closer to ensure 
compliance with the standard. 
3. How much latitude are employees allowed from standards? 
No answer 
a great deal 
large amount 
a moderate amount 
very little 
none 
Certainty Factor: 80 
See number two above. 
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4. What percentage of non-managerial employees are given written operating 
instructions or procedures for their job? 
No answer 
Ot020% 
21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 60 
Most non-managerial jobs have written procedures (i.e. how to operate a radar), while 
managers (leaders) have very few written procedures. 
5. Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures, to 





a great deal 
a very great deal 
no written instructions 
Certainty Factor: 75 
Given instructions, military personnel will carry them out to the best of their ability. 
6. To 'what extent are supervisors and middle managers free from rules, 
procedures, and policies when they make decisions? 
No answer 
a very great deal 




Certainty Factor: 80 
Supervisors and middle managers rarely deviate; they will carry out the intent of the 
commander. 
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7. What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the 
organization is in writing? 
No answer 
Oto 20% 
21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 60 
Most procedures for routine evolutions (i.e. radar scope operation, checklists for ship 
procedures, etc.) or emergencies (i.e. fire in equipment) are written, while non-routine 
operational procedures are not written (which is why they are non-routine). 
Current Centralization 
1. How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the 





a great deal 
a very great deal 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The top management (force commander and his staff), while not gathering the 
information themselves, will certainly tell subordinates what information is required for 
the planning process. The questions does not apply for the execution of decisions. 




21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The force commander will certainly want to examine the information gathered for the 
planning process. The question does not apply for the execution process. 
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21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The commander will direct his forces to execute his intent, but he will not control their 
actions unless it is in conflict with his intent. 
4. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing 







Certainty Factor: 80 
Budget is usually set by outside authority. 
5. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over 







Certainty Factor: 90 
The middle manager (unit commander) will forward a evaluation input (whether it is the 
unit commander's fitness report or an award for the unit) to the commander but the 
evaluation decision will be made by the force commander. 
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Certainty Factor: 80 
The middle manager has little input on who will be sent to his unit. The middle manger 
has more discretion over fIring personnel, but this takes great effort and must be 
documented and justifIed. Therefore, the answer to the question is some. 
7. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel 







Certainty Factor: 90 
Salary is set, promotions are determined by outside forces (selection boards or 
examination scores). The middle manager can promote a few individuals a year (via the 
Command Advancement Program) and can hand out awards which contribute points 
towards advancement scores or are looked a positively on an advancement board. 
8. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing 







Certainty Factor: 80 
The middle manager has great latitude over consumable supplies, but little control over 
larger p~chases (i.e. weapon systems). 
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9. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing 







Certainty Factor: 80 
Given the commanders intent, the middle manager has little discretion (However, there is 
large discretion on how to achieve that intent) .. 
10. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work 







Certainty Factor: 70 
Once the commander's intent is promulgated, the "chiefs" are tasked with carrying it out 
and do not need to be controlled by the commander. 
1. How many employees does this organization have? 
Input any number: 3,000 
Certainty Factor: 80 
This number, since the NCW organization is large, is not really important as 
Organizational Consultant will treat any number over 2,000 (when adjusted due to the 
professionalism score) as large (Burton, 1998, p. 153). 
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Age/Ownership 





Certainty Factor: 90 
The Force (a Joint Task Force of today) comes together for a specific mission and then 
dissolves. 






Certainty Factor: 75 
the military is a public institution. 
Diversity 





Certainty Factor: 80 
.Products are considered to be different weapon types and different kinds of forces. 





Certainty Factor: 80 
Each location could be considered a different market or the collection of many different 
locations could be considered one market. 
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3. Does the organization operate in more than one country? If yes, is the 
activity level abroad greater than 25% ? 
No answer 
Yes - activity level greater than 25% 
Yes - activity level lower than 25% 
no 
Certainty Factor: 80 
This question is not applicable as the entire area of operations could be in one country or 
encompass several countries. The entire operation is abroad. 






Certainty Factor: 80 
See number three above. 
Technology 






Certainty Factor: 60 
One could argue that the military is providing a service to the country (either the United 
States or the victim of belligerent action), however production for the military is viewed 
as providing energy at a given location at a given time. Hence, production is a more 
applicable answer. 
2. What kind of technology does the organization have? 
No answer 
a standard high volume retail 
a high automated retail 
a specialized customer oriented retail 
Certainty Factor: 100 
The technology is not retail. 
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Certainty Factor: 90 
The planning process has both easy-to-analyze problems and few exceptions (routine 
technology) and also difficult-to-resolve problems and many exceptions (non-routine 
technology). The execution process has more difficult to resolve problems and many 
exceptions (non-routine technology). 





Certainty Factor: 80 
Some tasks can be broken-down into smaller task, while others can not. 





Certainty Factor: 80 
No one technology dominates the force (although it is highly reliant on networks, 
connectivity, and decision support systems). 




Certainty Factor: 100 
Network Centric Warfare relies heavily on advanced information systems. 
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Environment 





Certainty Factor: 100 
The environment will certainly be complex. 





Certainty Factor: 100 
Uncertainly will be high - we will try to stay ahead of the adversary but military 
operations are always uncertain. 





Certainty Factor: 75 
Equivocality means ambiguity in the existence of multiple and conflicting interpretations 
of the organizational situation. High equivocality means confusion and lack of 
understanding. Equivocality means that asking a yes/no question is not feasible. You are 
not certain about which questions to ask about the environment and if a question is posed, 
the situation is ill defined to the point where a clear answer will not be forthcoming. You 
may not know where the problems are. On the planning side the equivocality is high, 
while during execution it will be medium since the planning process has removed some 
of the equivocality. 
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Certainty Factor: 80 
The competition is always assumed to be very hostile. 
Management Profile 
1. Top management may prefer to make most of the decisions themselves; or 
they may prefer to delegate numerous decisions to other managers i.e.;, greater 
preference for decentralization. What kind of decisions does top management 
prefer to make? 
No answer 
policy and general decisions 
both general and some operating decisions 
both general and operating decisions 
Certainty Factor: 90 
The commander will promulgate his intent and then step back and observe. 
2. Top management may prefer to make long-term decision or short-time 
decision. What kind of decisions does top management prefer to make? 
No answer 
/ongterm 
long term and short time 
short time 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The commander will decide the long term objectives (i.e. how the end the conflict) and 
what strategy to use in his intent. 
3. Top management may prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate 
information when making decisions. What level of detail of information does top 
management prefer to use when making decisions? 
No answer 
very detailed information 
medium detailed information 
very aggregate information 
Certainty Factor: 80 
During the planning process the commander will want to have as much information as 
possible. During execution, the commander will rely on more aggregate information. 
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4. Top management may prefer to be proactive in its thinking, anticipate future 
events and take pre-emptive action. It may be reactive; wait and see and then act. 
What is management's preference on taking action? 
No answer 
proactive anticipating future events 
some proactive and some reactive 
reactive to events as they occur 
Certainty Factor: 80 
Top management is more concerned with the planning process and will be looking into 
the future (proactive). 
5. Top management may be risk averse in its decision making or it may have a 





Certainty Factor: 80 
Risk is necessary but every step is taken to reduce the risk to our forces. 
6. Top management may prefer to manage through an ex ante motivation or ex 
post control techniques. What kind of motivation and control does top management 
prefer? 
No answer 
motivation through inspiration 
a combination of motivation and control 
using control techniques 
Certainty Factor: 75 









Certainty Factor: 90 
Military equipment and operations are expensive. 





Certainty Factor: 70 
The force controls the production - providing energy at a given location at a given time. 
Some proven methods will be used and some innovation will occur. 





Certainty Factor: 70 
Although forces will rely on proven methods, new methods will also be undertaken. 





Certainty Factor: 80 
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Certainty Factor: 100 
Price is not a concern of the commander. 
Climate Factors 
In this section the climate (morale) of the forces is assumed to be good. Questions are 
answered in a realistic manner with a slant towards a positive climate. 





Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty factor: 80 
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Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty Factor: 80 
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS FROM ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSULTANT (pLANNING PROCESS) 
REPORT SUMMARY - NCW Organization 
Time: 11 :00:21, 11124/98 
Scenario: Planning 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about 
your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's 
current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to 
the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, 
management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The writeup below 
summarizes the input data for the analysis. 
- NCW Organization has a simple configuration (cf75). 
- NCW Organization has a moderate number of different jobs (cf 80). 
- Of the employees at NCW Organization 51 to 75 % have an advanced degree or many 
years of special training (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has 1 or 2 vertical levels separating top management from the 
bottom level of the organization (cf 80). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 1 or 2 (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has 16 to 30 separate geographic locations (cf80). 
- NCW Organization's average distance of these separate units from the organization's 
headquarters is 101 to 500 miles (cf 100). 
- 61 to 90 % ofNCW Organiz;a.tion's total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 
80). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised loosely to ensure 
compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 80). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate a large amount from the standards (cf 80). 
- 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or 
procedures for their job (cf 60). 
- The Written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent (cf75). 
- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and 
policies when they make decisions (cf 80). 
- 21 to 40 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in 
writing (cf 60). 
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- Top Management is to a very great extent involved in gathering the infonnation they 
will use in making decisions (cf SO). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of more than SO % of the infonnation 
input (cf SO). 
- Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cfSO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 
SO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how hislher unit will be evaluated 
(cf90). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel 
(cfSO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary 
increases and promotions) (cf90). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and 
supplies (cf 80) . 
. - The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing a new project or 
program (cf 80). 
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over how work exceptions are to be 
handled (cf70). 
- NCW Organization has 3000 employees (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization's age is young (cf 90). 
- NCW Organization's ownership status is public (cf75). 
- NCW Organization has many different products (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has some different markets (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has an undertennined level of international activity (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization has an undetennined number of different products in the foreign 
markets (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization's major activity is categorized as production (cf60). 
- NCW Organization has an undetermined production technology (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization has a medium routine technology (cf90). 
- NCW Organization's technology is somewhat divisible (cfSO). 
- NCW Organization's technology dominance is average (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization has either planned or already has an advanced infonnation system 
(cf 100). 
- NCW Organization's environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty ofNCW Organization's environment is high (cf 100). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is high (cf75). 
- NCW Organization's environment is extremely hostile (cf SO). 
- Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 
90). 
- Top management primarily prefers to make long-tenn decisions (cfSO). 
- Top management has a preference for very detailed infonnation when making decisions 
(cfSO). 
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- Top management has a preference for proactive actions (cfSO). 
- Top management is risk neutral (cf 80). 
- Top management has a preference for motivation through inspiration (cf75). 
- NCW Organization operates in an industry with a high capital requirement (cf90). 
- NCW Organization has a medium product innovation (cf 70). 
- NCW Organization has a medium process innovation (cf 70). 
- NCW Organization has a high concern for quality (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization's price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100). 
- The level of trust is high (cfSO). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf SO). 
- The employee morale is high (cf 80). 
- Rewards are given in a moderately equitably fashion (cf SO). 
- The resistance to change is medium (cf SO). 
- The leader credibility is high (cf 80). 
- The level of scapegoating is low (cf 80). 
THE SIZE 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of 
employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large 
(cfSO). 
Between 51 and 75 % of the people employed byNCW Orgaruzationhave a high level of 
education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is 
greater than 2,000 and NeW Organization is categorized as large. 
THE CLIMATE 
·The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a 
developmental climate (cf76). 
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative 
place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to 
be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment 
to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. 
Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long-
term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique 
and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The 
organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
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When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the organization 
has a developmental climate. Employees with a high morale is frequently one element of 
a developmental climate. Moderately to high equitable rewards in the organization drives 
the climate towards a developmental climate. Medium to high leader credibility 
characterizes an organization with a developmental climate. An organization with a 
medium level of scapegoating may have a developmental climate. 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE 
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; 
managers have a high preference for microinvolvement. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a 
low preference for microinvolvement (cf73). 
The management of NCW Organization has a preference for delegating decisions. This 
will lead toward a low preference for microinvolvement. Management has a long-term 
horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a preference for a low 
microinvolvement. The management of NCW Organization has a preference for taking 
actions when making decisions. This will lead toward a low preference for 
micro involvement because meeting the problems before they arise allow you to work on 
the general level and not being consumed with the very detailed decisions that can best be 
made at lower level in the organization. Management has a preference for motivating 
people and not using control which will lead toward a low preference for 
microinvolvement. 
THE STRATEGY 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with 
innovation, analyzer without . innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow 
Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to 
a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what 
is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is 
an analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 72). 
It could also be: a prospector (cf 65). 
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that 
combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of 
a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
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analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. It has a dual technology core. 
For a medium routine technology, NCW Organization has some flexibility. It is 
consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. With a concern for high quality an 
analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy for NCW Organization. 
An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for 
market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and 
uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong 
concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely 
efficient. 
F or a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development or market opportunities 
exploitation, it requires a high capital investment. NCW Organization has numerous 
products. A prospector is constantly seeking new product opportunities to serve the 
existing and potentially new customers. With a concern for high quality a prospector 
strategy is a likely strategy for NCW Organization. With top management preferring a 
relatively low level of micro involvement, the strategy is likely to be prospector. 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization 
have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be 
recommendations for the organization. 
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 82). 
The current horizontal differentiation is medium (cf 80). 
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 80). 
The current spatial differentiation is high (cf 80). 
The current centralization is medium (cf 81). 
The current formalization is medium (cf76). 
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
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SITUATION MISFITS 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy. 
There are no situation misfits (cf 100). 
No situational misfits encountered. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the 
greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational Consultant has derived 
recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a 
divisional configuration (cf 69). 
It could also be: a matrix (cf 62). 
It could also be: an adhocracy (cf 60). 
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -80). 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit grouping into 
relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, (product, customer, or 
geographical grouping). 
When the organization is large, the configuration can be a divisional configuration. 
Because the organization has many products, the configuration should be divisional. The 
divisionalization ofNCW Organization may be based on products or product groups. 
Because the technology is not fully divisible, care should be taken in recommending a 
divisional configuration. 
A matrix structure is a structure that assigns specialists from functional departments to 
work on one or more interdisciplinary teams that are led by project leaders. Permanent 
product teams are also possible. A dual hierarchy manages the same activities and 
individuals at the same time. 
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When NCW Organization has many products or markets, a matrix configuration is a 
likely configuration. When NCW Organization's environment has neither low 
equivocality nor low complexity, the configuration should be matrix. When NCW 
Organization is large, the configuration can be a matrix configuration. An organization 
with a developmental climate could have a matrix configuration. 
An adhocracy organization is normally an organization with high horizontal 
differentiation, low vertical differentiation, low formalization, decentralization, and great 
flexibility and responsiveness. 
An adhocracy configuration is appropriate when neither the environmental equivocality 
of NCW Organization nor the environmental uncertainty is low. NCW Organization has 
many products or many markets which indicates that an adhocracy is an appropriate 
configuration. When the organization is also young, the conclusion that it should bean 
adhocracy is further strengthened. Since top management has a low preference for 
micro involvement, the ad hoc configuration is feasible. However, the size of the 
organization is not very important for the choice of an adhocracy configuration. 
When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A 
machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 55). 
It, too, could be: medium (cf54). 
Not much is known about the environment since both the environmental uncertainty and 
the environmental equivocality of NCW Organization are high. In this situation, the 
organizational complexity should be low. This allows the organization to adapt quickly. 
When the environmental hostility of NCW Organization is high, organizational 
complexity should be low. 
Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational complexity. NCW 
Organization has a technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the 
organizational complexity should be medium. Because NCW Organization has an 
advanced information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could 
otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization requires a medium level of 
complexity . 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 55). 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf79). 
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The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf71). 
Since the set of variables in the environment that will be important is not known and 
since it is not possible to predict what will happen, no efficient rules and procedures can 
be developed, which implies that NCW Organization's formalization should be low. 
When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. Low formalization is 
consistent with top management having a low preference for microinvolvement. A 
developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization. 
The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 50). 
When there is a high capital requirement and the product innovation is medium, as is the 
case for NCW Organization, centralization should be rather high to obtain efficiency. 
When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action 
and centralization must be high. Because NCW Organization has an advanced 
information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise. 
NCW Organization's span of control should be moderate (cf 60). 
Since NCW Organization has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate 
span of control. 
NCW Organization should use media with high media richness (cf 85). 
The information media that NCW Organization uses should provide a large amount of 
information (cf 85). 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 85). 
NCW Organization should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 86). 
When the environment of NCW Organization has high equivocality, high uncertainty, 
and high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through integrators and 
group meetings. The richness of the media should be high with a large amount of 
information. Incentives must be results based. Coordination within each division is very 
important. Coordination between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top 
management, which is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds 
between (among) the divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing 
technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison managers and 
technology committees are possible coordination mechanisms. Conferences among 
technical professionals can be very effective. When the organization has a developmental 
climate, coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. 
Incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. An organization with a 
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developmental climate will likely have to process a large amount of information and will 
need information media with high richness. 
ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS 
Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current 
organization. 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match. 
Current and prescribed centralization do not match. 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
Current and prescribed configuration do not match. 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDA nONS 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100). 
Top management may control the execution of decisions more actively. 
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are 
available. 
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures. 
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and 
procedures. 
The typical middle manager may be given less discretion over how work exceptions are 
to be handled. 




APPENDIX C: RESULTS FROM ORGANIZATIONAL 
CONSULTANT (EXECUTION PROCESS) 
REPORT SUMMARY - NCW Organization 
Time: 11 :08:00, 11124/98 
Scenario: Execution 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about 
your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's' 
current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to 
the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, 
management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The writeup below 
summarizes the input data for the analysis. 
- NCW Organization has an adhocracy configuration (cf75). 
- NCW Organization has a moderate number of different jobs (cf 80). 
- Of the employees at NCW Organization 51 to 75 % have an advanced degree or many 
years of special training (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has 1 or 2 vertical levels separating top management from the 
bottom level of the organization (cf 80). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 1 or 2 (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization has 16 to 30 separate geographic locations (cf 80). 
- NCW Organization's average distance of these separate units from the organization's 
headquarters is 101 to 500 miles (cf 100). 
- 61 to 90 % ofNCW Organization's total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 
80). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 100). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised moderately closely 
to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 80). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate a moderate amount from the standards (cf 80). 
- 81 to 100 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or 
procedures for their job (cf 60). 
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent (cf75). 
- Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and 
policies when they make decisions (cf 80). 
- 21 to 40 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in 
writing (cf 60). 
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- Top Management is in an undetermined way involved in gathering the information they 
will use in making decisions (cf 100). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of an undetermined percentage of the 
infonnation input (cf 100). 
- Top management directly controls 0 to 20 % of the decisions executed (cfSO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing his or her budget (cf 
SO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over how hislher unit will be evaluated 
(cf90). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel 
(cfSO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over personnel rewards - (ie, salary 
increases and promotions) (cf90). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over purchasing equipment and 
supplies (cf SO). 
- The typical middle manager has little discretion over establishing a new project or 
program (cf SO). 
- The typical middle manager has great discretion over how work exceptions are to be 
handled (cf 70). 
- NCW Organization has 3000 employees (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization's age is young (cf 90). 
- NCW Organization's ownership status is public (cf75). 
- NCW Organization has many different products (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization has some different markets (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization has an undertermined level of international activity (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization has an undetermined number of different products in the foreign 
markets (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization's major activity is categorized as production (cf 60). 
- NCW Organization has an undetermined production technology (cf 100). 
- NCW Organization has a nonroutine technology (cf 90). 
- NCW Organization's technology is somewhat divisible (cf SO). 
- NCW Organization's technology dominance is average (cfSO). 
- NCW Organization has either planned or already has an advanced infonnation system 
(cf 100). 
- NCW Organization's environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty ofNCW Organization's environment is high (cf 100). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is medium (cf75). 
- NCW Organization'S environment is extremely hostile (cfSO). 
- Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 
90). 
- Top management primarily prefers to make long-term decisions (cf SO). 
- Top management has a preference for very aggregate information when making 
decisions (cf SO). 
120 
- Top management has a preference for proactive actions (cf SO). 
- Top management is risk neutral (cfSO). 
- Top management has a preference for motivation through inspiration (cf75). 
- NeW Organization operates in an industry with a high capital requirement (cf 90). 
- NeW Organization has a medium product innovation (cf 70). 
- NCW Organization has a medium process innovation (cf70). 
- NeW Organization has a high concern for quality (cf SO). 
- NeW Organization's price level is undetennined relative to its competitors (cf 100). 
- The level of trust is high (cfSO). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf SO). 
- The employee morale is high (cf SO). 
- Rewards are given in a moderately equitably fashion (cfSO). 
- The resistance to change is medium (cf SO). 
- The leader credibility is high (cf SO). 
- The level of scapegoating is low (cf SO). 
THE SIZE 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of 
employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large 
(cfSO). 
Between 51 and 75 % of the people employed by NeW Organization have a high level of 
education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is 
greater than 2,000 and NeW Organization is categorized as large. 
THE CLIMATE 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a 
developmental climate (cf76). 
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative 
place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to 
be inn<?vators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment 
to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. 
Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long-
tenn emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique 
and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The 
organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
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When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the organization 
has a developmental climate. Employees with a high morale is frequently one element of 
a developmental climate. Moderately to high equitable rewards in the organization drives 
the climate towards a developmental climate. Medium to high leader credibility 
characterizes an organization with a developmental climate. An organization with a 
medium level of scapegoating may have a developmental climate. 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE 
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement; 
managers have a high preference for micro involvement. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a 
low preference for microinvolvement (cf 80). 
The management of NCW Organization has a preference for delegating decisions. This 
will lead toward a low preference for microinvolvement. Management has a long-term 
horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a preference for a low 
micro involvement. Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the 
basis of very aggregate information a low preference for microinvolvement 
characterization is appropriate. The management of NCW Organizatio~ has a preference 
for taking actions when making decisions. This will lead toward a low preference for 
microinvolvement because meeting the problems before they arise allow you to work on 
the general level and not being consumed with the very detailed decisions that can best be 
made at lower level in the organization. Management has a preference for motivating 
people and not using control which will lead toward a low preference for 
micro involvement. 
THE STRATEGY 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with 
innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow 
Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to 
a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what 
is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is a 
prospector strategy (cf76). 
An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for 
market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and 
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uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong 
concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely 
efficient. 
For a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development or market opportunities 
exploitation, it requires a high capital investment. A non-routine technology is likely to 
be costly for NCW Organization, and a prospector strategy of new product development 
where margins are likely to be high is very reasonable. NCW Organization has numerous 
products. A prospector is constantly seeking new product opportunities to serve the 
existing and potentially new customers. With a concern for high quality a prospector 
strategy is a likely strategy for NCW Organization. With top management preferring a 
relatively low level of microinvolvement, the strategy is likely to be prospector. 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization 
have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be 
recommendations for the organization. 
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 82). 
The current horizontal differentiation is medium (cf 80). 
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 80). 
The current spatial differentiation is high (cf 80). 
The current centralization is medium (cf 85). 
The current formalization is high (cf76). 
'The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
SITUATION MISFITS 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy. 
There are no situation misfits (cf 100). 
No situational misfits encountered. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONSUL TANT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the 
greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational Consultant has derived 
recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be an 
adhocracy configuration (cf73). 
It could also be: a simple (cf 65). 
It is certainly not: a functional (cf -87). 
It is certainly not: a professional bureaucracy (cf -97). 
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf -99). 
An adhocracy organization is normally an organization with high horizontal 
differentiation, low vertical differentiation, low formalization, decentralization, and great 
flexibility and responsiveness. 
An adhocracy configuration is appropriate when neither the environmental equivocality 
of NCW Organization nor the environmental uncertainty is low. NCW Organization has 
many products or many markets which indicates that an adhocracy is an appropriate 
configuration. When the organization is also young, the conclusion that it should bean 
adhocracy is further strengthened. Since top management has a low preference for 
microinvolvement, the ad hoc configuration is feasible. However, the size of the 
organization is not very important for the choice of an adhocracy configuration. A 
prospector like NCW Organization should be configured as an ad hoc organization. 
A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision 
making. 
The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has 
extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the 
organi~tion can respond consistently and rapid to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it 
must have a simple configuration. 
A prospector like NCW Organization can be configured as a simple organization. 
The configuration cannot be a functional configuration when the technology is 
nonroutine. 
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Because the organization does not have a routine technology, it is not likely that a 
professional bureaucracy is an efficient organization. 
Since the organization has a prospector strategy, it cannot have a configuration like a 
professional bureaucracy. 
When the organization has a nonroutine technology, it is not likely that a machine 
bureaucracy is an efficient organization. 
When the organization has a prospector strategy, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy! 
When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A 
machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 54). 
It, too, could be: high (cf54). 
It, too, could be: low (cf 51). 
Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational complexity. The 
environmental uncertainty of NCW Organization is high, and the equivocality of NCW 
Organization's environment is medium. For this situation the organizational complexity 
should be medium. There is no need for an elaborate hierarchy or work specialization. 
Because NCW Organization has an advanced information system, organizational 
complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. A developmental climate in the 
organization requires a medium level of complexity. 
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. Then, the organizational complexity should 
be either low or high. NCW Organization has a nonroutine technology, which implies 
that the organizational complexity should be high. Top management of NCW 
Organization has a preference for a low level of microinvolvement, which allows for a 
higher organizational complexity. Because NCW Organization has an advanced 
information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. 
Since the size of NCW Organization is large and NCW Organization has a nonroutine 
technology, the complexity should be high - particularly the vertical differentiation. 
NCW Organization has a prospector strategy. Then, the organizational complexity should 
be either low or high. When the environmental hostility of NCW Organization is high, 
organizational complexity should be low. 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 51). 
It, too, could be: high (cf51). 
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The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 59). 
It, too, could be: high (cf 51). 
The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 77). 
When the organization is in the manufacturing industry and it does not have a routine 
technology, its formalization should be higher than if it had been in the service industry. 
NeW Organization has a prospector strategy. A low formalization is required so that the 
organization can react quickly. Low formalization is also required because of the need for 
innovations. Organizations with nonroutine technology should have low formalization. 
When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. Low formalization is 
consistent with top management having a low preference for microinvolvement. A. 
developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization. 
The recommended degree of centralization is low (cf 48). 
New Organization has a prospector strategy. A low centralization is required so that the 
organization can react and innovate quickly. Large organizations should have low 
centralization. Since NeW Organization operates in a complex environment and knows 
only some of the factors that affect the organization and when the values of the factors 
are relatively unstable, centralization should be low. Low centralization can be allowed 
when top management has no desire for microinvolvement. A developmental climate in 
the organization requires a medium to low level of centralization. 
New Organization's span of control should be narrow (cf 58). 
Since NeW Organization has a nonroutine technology, it should have a narrow span of 
control. 
New Organization should use media with high media richness (cf 85). 
The information media that NeW Organization uses should provide a large amount of 
information (cf 95). 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 95). 
New Organization should use professionalization as means for coordination and control 
(cf 100). 
With a nonroutine technology NeW Organization should obtain coordination and control 
via group meetings. Media with high richness and large amount of information should be 
used. Incentives should be based on results. When NeW Organization's environment has 
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medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and high complexity, coordination and control 
should be obtained through integrators and group meetings. The richness of the media 
used should be medium with a large amount of information to cope with the 
environmental complexity and uncertainty. Incentives must be results based. An open 
organizational climate and team spirit must be fostered. Information must be shared 
among all levels. Constructive conflict on 'what to do' will be usual. Individual tolerance 
of ambiguity and uncertainty will be necessary. Individual performance evaluation will be 
problematic and largely subjective. Mutual adjustments of 'give and take' will be the 
norm. Frequent informal meetings and temporary task forces will be the primary 
coordinating devices. When the organization has a developmental climate, coordination 
should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. Incentives could be results 
based with an individual orientation. An organization with a developmental climate will 
likely have to process a large amount of information and will need information media 
with high richness. 
ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS 
Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current 
organization. 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
Current and prescribed centralization do not match. 
Current and prescribed complexity do not match. 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100). 
Middle managers may be given more discretion over evaluations. 
The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over personnel rewards. 
Middle managers may be given more discretion over establishing budgets. 
The typical middle manager may be given more discretion over establishing a new 
program or project. 
You may consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are 
available. 
You may give supervisors and middle managers fewer rules and procedures. 
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and 
procedures. 
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